GLORY, DEATH, AND TRANSFIGURATION: THE SUSQUEHANNOCK INDIANS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

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INTRODUCTION

In the early seventeenth century, when Englishmen began to plant permanent settlements in the New World, Captain John Smith made the acquaintance of some impressive Indians who lived on the Susquehanna River above Chesapeake Bay. Smith portrayed them to an astonished book-buying world as giants. One of them, he wrote, was so huge that the calf of his leg was "three quarters of a yard about." 1

In the mid-nineteenth century, when Americans were driving Indians of every tribe farther and farther west, Boston brahmin Francis Parkman made the acquaintance of some historical sources that mentioned the Susquehannocks. With characteristic artistry, Parkman exterminated those Indians in a conflict with the Iroquois Five Nations, thus enabling the Iroquois to extend "their conquests and their depredations from Quebec to the Carolinas." 2

There have been more valid accounts since, but the power of art over fact has never been better demonstrated. Though Parkman's extermination had exactly the same existence in reality as Smith's giants, both Smith and Parkman can be purchased readily today in many editions. The works of the men who corrected them circulate in small numbers among specialists.8

Though scholars now reject the myths of Smith and Parkman, little has been done to find out what the actual facts were. The effort should be made, simply in order to get the story right. However, there is an extra reward for the job. In negative terms an archaeologist writes, "The major events of Susquehannock history were mere by-products of the history of the Iroquois and of the European settlements." 4 His "mere" is debatable; when his remark is put positively it means that Susquehannock history is part of colonial history. The seventeenth century was a period of ethnocultural adaptation and conflict for all the peoples of the New World, white and red alike, and their histories were mutual and reciprocal. Lack of understanding of the Susquehannocks prevents us from properly understanding the colonies. Knowledge of the Susquehannocks affords explanations, for example, of the strange behavior of New York's

2 Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac (2 v., Boston, 1909) 1: pp. 9–10; Count Frontenac and New France Under Louis XIV (Boston, 1909), p. 78. In later works Parkman modified his statements, but even at his most temperate he was factually wrong. In La Salle he wrote that the Iroquois "reduced the formidable and

3 John Witthoft and W. Fred Kinsey, III, eds., Susquehannock Miscellany (Harrisburg, Pa., 1959) is almost

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governors as they watched with apparent unconcern the raids of the Iroquois into Maryland and Virginia. We discover why Pennsylvania escaped the raids even before William Penn appeared. We come upon the scene in which the “covenant chain” of Indians under Iroquois leadership was forged, and we see the roles played by Europeans in its creation. We learn how empires and provinces made undeclared and unrecorded war upon each other through Indian instrumentalities.

And, of course, there are the Susquehannocks themselves. No one has yet explained satisfactorily the strange circumstances under which they were attacked and dispersed from their homeland. The thesis of this study is that they were dispersed as the consequence of Lord Baltimore’s efforts to seize and annex the Delaware Bay colony to Maryland. The Iroquois, far from conquering the Susquehannocks, provided sanctuary and support for them. Baltimore’s aggressions boomeranged; his attacks on the Susquehannocks brought bloody reprisals against his province’s settlers and a weakening of his political controls; his attacks on the Delaware Bay colony alienated the provinces that might have prevented the reprisals or cut them short; his self-created isolation weakened his claims in the boundary dispute that came into being with the chartering of Pennsylvania, effectually truncating instead of expanding his province. After the overthrow of Baltimore’s government by revolution, the Susquehannocks reconstituted their “nation,” and were recognized by treaty once again.

This study traces the varying relations of power and dependency among specific Indian peoples and specific European colonies. It relies on no “laws” of nature or history, and it recognizes no such ideological abstractions as “savagery” or “civilization.” The study proceeds by identification and analysis of critical issues and events, together with description of the initiatives and responses of particular persons and groups. The moment of greatest mystery, the period from 1673 to 1677, is at the climax, but it is put in perspective in the time span from about 1640 to about 1685. Brief notice is also taken of earlier and later years.

This is the first time that a consecutive narrative has put into one context the superficially disparate phenomena mentioned above. Accordingly it may be helpful to say a word here about the sources and method I have used. Except for one or two happy accidents, I lay no claim to discovering new sources of information. A limited corpus of documents has survived from the seventeenth century, and most of my references will be recognized by specialists. What I have tried to do is to compare hitherto unrelated sets of data and read fresh meaning into them. Having earlier made the discovery that political papers of the colonial era were often written deceitfully, especially those dealing with Indian affairs, I have tried to read between the lines as well as on them. Not many historians of the period have been willing to venture far in that direction, and their hesitation is understandable. A considerable amount of hypothesizing is sometimes required to hook together a few fragments of information. Nevertheless, I have taken the risks of imaginative error because the alternative, it seems to me, is to remain enslaved to the deceptions and purposes of the source writers. Rather than repeat ancient error, I would prefer to originate my own. Lest depreciation be overdrawn, let me suggest that this method has more to recommend it than personal eccentricity. There is too much of going around in circles in what is loosely and inaccurately called frontier history. At the least, my theses get out of some well-worn ruts; if they are wrong, perhaps they will stimulate a very necessary rethinking by other scholars. I have aimed at much more than this least goal, and I have presented my narrative without diffidence because I think it hangs together. In the circumstances, readers are entitled to demand all the evidence available, so documentation is given with some fullness. I suggest that the article will read most easily if reference to the notes is postponed until after completion of the narrative text.

**PREHISTORY**

The Susquehannocks were once thought to be of southern origin, but archaeological evidence now confirms a tradition of Mohawk ancestry. Their forebears, along with the ancestors of the Cayugas, are supposed to have split off from the Iroquois Mohawks at about A.D. 1300. About 1550 the Susquehannocks become identifiable archaeologically as a separate tribal entity, then residing in widespread small hamlets on the North Branch of the Susquehanna River, in an area between the present-day cities of Scranton, Pennsyl-
They had a sedentary agricultural so-

A short distance to the headwaters of Appoquin-

Unlike many other Indians whose trade was monop-

This was not so easy a matter. European de-

NEIGHBORING PEOPLES

The main direction of Susquehannock activity

short distances to the headwaters of Appoquin-

9 C. A. Weslager, Dutch Explorers, Traders and Set-

tlers in the Delaware Valley, 1609-1664 (Philadelphia,

10 Isaack de Rasière to the Amsterdam Chamber of the

11 "Relation of Captain Thomas Yong, 1634," Narra-

tives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey, and Dela-

12 Amandus Johnson, The Swedish Settlements on the

Holzinger, "A Susquehannock Cemetery: The Ibaugh

Site," Susquehannock Miscellany, p. 111.

Withthof, "Ancestry," p. 33; The Jesuit Relations and

Allied Documents . . . 1610-1791, ed., Reuben Gold

Thwaites (73 v., Cleveland, 1890-1901) 18: pp. 233-234.

The skeletal remains unearthed at one site

show a height ranging from 4 feet, 10.9 inches, to

5 feet, 7.7 inches, with a mean stature of 5 feet,

3.7 inches.7 They had a sedentary agricultural so-

ciety with a familiar division of labor in which

the women farmed while the men hunted, fished,

traded, and fought.8

Archaeological evidence indicates that their stat-

ure was, if anything, rather short by modern stand-

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The main direction of Susquehannock activity

was up and down the Susquehanna River. At the

river's headwaters were the Iroquois Five Nations

who were flanked to the north and west by the

Hurons, to the north by the French of Canada,

and to the east by the Dutch of Rensseelaerswyck

and Fort Orange (Albany) on the Hudson. Sur-

rounding the Chesapeake Bay, into which the Sus-

quehanna falls, were the English of Maryland and

more distant Virginia. The more important In-

dian peoples of the upper end of the bay included

the Piscatawes of the Potomac valley, the Sus-

quehannocks themselves on their river, and the

Nanticokes of the bay's eastern shore. In the Dela-

ware valley, east of the Susquehanna and

parallel with it, were the Lenape, the "grand-

fathers" of all the eastern Algonquian peoples.

Here, again, the Dutch were nearby: after con-

quering the Swedish settlers on the Delaware in

1655, the Dutch planted their colony of New

Amstel (New Castle) only twenty miles away

from the head of Chesapeake Bay. Today an

intercoastal waterways canal carries shipping across

the narrow neck of land that separates the two

bays. Indians and colonists traversed the isthmus

by canoe, with a choice of several creeks and por-

tages. They might paddle from the Chesapeake

up the Elk River and its tributaries, portaging
Map 1. Indian tribes and trading centers. The maps for this article have been drafted by Barbara J. Berquist under the direction of the author. They are for orientation and illustration; cartographic precision is not attempted.
LENAPE TRIBUTARIES

In the aftermath it was reported by a Swede that the Lenape had become “subject and tributary” to the Susquehannocks (as of 1645). Some Dutchmen, in 1651, affirmed that Lenape sachems acknowledged themselves to hold office “by descent and appointment” of both the Lenape and the Susquehannocks. These phrases have been accepted too readily to mean that the Susquehannocks exerted control and mastery over the Lenape, after the model of European conquest. Under such an interpretation, however, the subsequently recorded data of Susquehannock-Lenape relationships become nonsensical. Assuming that the Lenape for a greater or lesser period of time acknowledged themselves tributary to the Susquehannocks, and knowing that the same issue of tributary significance occurs repeatedly in the history of Indian peoples, we need to analyze the situation to see how it was understood by the people involved in it.

To Europeans, a status of tributary subjection implies loss of sovereignty and perhaps also the loss of ownership or use of territory. It implies arbitrary management of the subjects in the interest of the ruling people or government. These conditions did not occur in the Susquehannock-Lenape relationships become nonsensical. Assuming that the Lenape for a greater or lesser period of time acknowledged themselves tributary to the Susquehannocks, and knowing that the same issue of tributary significance occurs repeatedly in the history of Indian peoples, we need to analyze the situation to see how it was understood by the people involved in it.


For detailed discussion of sources, see this article’s appendix, “Lenape Ownership of Delaware Valley Lands.”

The History of Maryland

Loc. cit. Susquehannock willingness to abstain from interference in Lenape land sales is especially significant because the Susquehannocks had ceded to Maryland in 1652 some territory on the Chesapeake Eastern Shore, which was occupied by other tribal groups (but not by the Lenape-related Nanticoke). See C. A. Westager, *The English on the Delaware, 1610–1682* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1967).
attempted to exercise close supervision over their tributaries. The same observer who gave us the phrase "subject and tributary" also recorded "Discourses which took place at a Council held by the [Lenape] Indians in 1645," in which the crucial issue was whether to make an exterminating war upon the Swedish settlements on the Delaware. The council decided for peace. Obviously the Swede who recorded it could not have been an eyewitness, and the dialogue seems much edited; but it clearly aims at realism, and it says nothing of the presence or consideration of any Susquehannock while the Lenape debated war upon the Susquehannocks' trading partners. This surely was a strange kind of subjection. 17

The 1645 council was not an isolated event. Again, in 1655, the Swedes were menaced by a Lenape war, and this time the threat was made explicitly against the interests of the Susquehannocks. Governor Johann Rising reported that the Susquehannocks called themselves the Swedes' "protectors," but that the Lenape threatened to destroy the trade between the Susquehannocks and the Swedes. It is indisputable that Rising had small faith in the protection of the Susquehannocks; like his predecessor, he demanded soldiers from Sweden to drive off the unruly Lenape. It seems clear that the Susquehannocks were in no position to give simple commands to their subjects and tributaries, if indeed the Lenape still acknowledged themselves as such. 18

The point of this argument is that political relations between Indian peoples were specific to the conditions of their cultures. In one respect only were the relations between Indians absolutely and unambiguously like those of European states—there was constant change. Curiously this one true constant has sometimes been flatly denied by historians and is only recently coming to be recognized as fundamental. Because of its denial, the Lenape of some histories have been kept in a pre-sumed bondage to the Susquehannocks until a transfer, and empire were alike imaginary. We know that they maintained separate political territories in the Susquehanna and Delaware valleys, and that they respected each other's tenure rights. We know that they continued to live in their respective territories in the Susquehanna and Delaware valleys, and that they respected each other's tenure rights. We know that they maintained separate councils and negotiated diplomatically with each other and with third parties. We know that the Lenape could not get access to the Susquehannocks' hunting grounds where beaver were to be had after the depletion of the beaver in the Delaware valley. Perhaps this last fact is the single most important clue; perhaps the most important function of Lenape tribute wampum, apart from the intrinsic value of the wampum itself, was simply to certify and renew a promise to stay clear of the Susquehannocks' hunting and trade, while permitting the Susquehannocks' access to European markets in Lenape territory. In the circumstances, this seems like a reasonable guess. 19

SUSQUEHANNOCK ASCENDANCY

The Lenape were not the only people on the bays to be defeated, without being conquered, by the Susquehannocks. In the winter of 1643–1644, an expeditionary force sent out by Maryland suffered a damaging defeat. Besides casualties suffered on the field, the Marylanders lost fifteen prisoners and two small pieces of field artillery. Efforts to ransom the prisoners were rejected. The Susquehannocks tortured them horribly to death. Eight years elapsed before the Susquehannocks made formal peace with Maryland. 20

Their victory stands out in sharp contrast against background events. Other Indians also...

19 In 1684 Maryland's acting Governor George Talbot told William Penn that "the Susquehannocks are now noe Nation," but that their hunting lands "was never hunted on in theire time by the Delaware Indians nor any others but the Susquehannohs Indians onely." Narratives of Early Maryland, 1633–1684, ed., Clayton Colman Hall (New York, 1910), p. 25.
20 Report of Governor Johan Printz, 1644, Myers, Narratives, p. 102; Council minutes, 18 June, 1644, and 28 June, 1652, Archives of Maryland (69 v., Baltimore, 1883– ) 3: pp. 149–150, 276, 277 (hereinafter Md. Arch.); Peter Lindestrom, Geographia Americae with an Account of the Delaware Indians, Based on Surveys and Notes Made in 1654–1656, trans. and ed., Amandus Johnson (Philadelphia, 1925), pp. 241–244. Lindestrom calls it a battle with "the English of Virginia," but Virginia was the only name he used for any Englishmen on the Chesapeake which he called the Bay of Virginia. His mention of the field artillery corresponds with that detail in the Archives of Maryland.
did battle against Europeans in that turbulent time. The Esopus Indians rose against the Dutch, and Opechancanough's Powhatans attacked the Virginians. That they inflicted frightful damage cannot be gainsaid; but when the thunders of European rhetoric cease reverberating in the histories, one hears a toll of "savage" vengeance taken by the Europeans that far exceeded the demands of the Mosaic code. Cause and effect are not to be argued here. The relevant point is simply this: Europeans smashed the Esopus and Powhatan risings, but Europeans were not able to win against the Susquehannocks. This was the zenith of Susquehannock pride and power. In 1647 "a single village" of their people was reputed to have 1,300 men able to bear arms.\textsuperscript{21} Just how many villages they had, or what their total population approximated, does not appear, but they seem to have outnumbered impressively the thin populations of their nearest European neighbors.

To outward appearances, then, the Susquehannocks were the Great Power in their part of the world, but Susquehannock power was illusory because the mechanism for generating it was beyond Susquehannock control. That mechanism was the fur trade. To maintain their glory, the

\textsuperscript{21} Paul Ragueneau, "des Hurons," 16 April, 1648, \textit{Jesuit Relations} 33: p. 129.

\textbf{Map 2.} The Susquehanna River route from north to south.
Susquehannocks had to get the weaponry that only Europeans could supply and that only peltry could buy. To get the peltry, the Susquehannocks had to hunt and fight under rules of competition set by conditions of geography and communication. Great distances lay between hunting grounds and markets. The cycle of the trade could not be completed without secure access to both a source of peltry and a source of trade goods. For a while, at least, Susquehannock military prowess and a spirit of competition among the Europeans of the southern bays had assured control of access to a market. But it was not sufficient to be mighty at the river's mouth; the best furs were beyond its fountainheads. In those distant regions the Susquehannocks were no longer so great a Power as in their homeland. Other Indian peoples, with equal or greater numbers, with determination just as fierce, and with exactly the same objectives, strove for mastery of the routes to the rich interior.

The best route for the Susquehannocks was up the Susquehanna River's West Branch toward Lake Erie. There the interlacing headwaters of the Susquehanna, the Ohio, and the Great Lakes gave easy transportation for heavy burdens; the beaver of the west were plentiful; and the indigenous Indians apparently cooperated in one way or another. But the Susquehannocks were not the only trading Indians to head west. The Hurons had established an annual circuit of operations there, and the desperate Iroquois thrust themselves into the Lakes region to acquire the commercial quantities of furs no longer available through peaceful means after 1640. Competition became keen and ruthless.

At one point the Susquehannocks apparently considered setting up a sort of Indian cartel. At the height of their power they offered alliance to

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22 Hunt, p. 34. Hunt has written the classic, but sometimes erroneous, description of competition among Indians for the trade with Canada and Fort Orange. See his chapters 3 to 6. Hunt's work falters when he discusses the Susquehannocks, and he wrongly rejects the possibility of Dutch intrigue among the Indians. Realistic about other nationalities, he credits the Dutch with a "truly moderate and always humane" attitude toward their French competitors (p. 172). Unrealizingly he cites a contradictory example on p. 137.

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MAP. 3. The Susquehanna River route to the west.
the Hurons, proposing that they and the Hurons jointly should approach each of the five Iroquois nations separately—Senecas, Cayugas, Onondagas, Oneidas, and Mohawks—to propose a peace which "would not hinder the trade of all those countries with one another." Those who did not agree would get war. The Hurons were willing to negotiate, but the Mohawks had had enough already of Huron diplomacy. The Mohawks had negotiated with the Hurons and the French in 1645 for a share of the western beaver trade, only to be double-crossed. Besides, the Mohawks would be at a hopeless disadvantage in an "unhindered" trade. They were compelled, by proximity and politics, to use Rensselaerswyck or Fort Orange as their market, and these posts were far more distant from beaver country than either the Hurons' market at Montreal or the Susquehannocks' market on the Delaware and Chesapeake. Unhindered trade under these conditions would have meant no trade at all for the Mohawks. As George T. Hunt puts it, "the Susquehannah embassies went to the Iroquois pleading for a continuance of a trade in which the Iroquois were to have no part." The Mohawks' response was to devastate Huronia in 1649 and 1650. A great Mohawk effort to achieve the same sort of lightning conquest of the Susquehannocks in the winter of 1651–1652 was repulsed, but conflicting reports suggest that the Susquehannocks suffered heavy losses. Shortly afterward they made their peace with Maryland, apparently to be able to concentrate on their northern enemies.

With this introduction the ensuing wars should logically have centered on a Mohawk-Susquehannock contest, and the historian is puzzled to find that nothing of the sort occurred. Indeed everything seems to turn out wrong. The Mohawks cooperate with the Susquehannocks and brawl with the other Iroquois nations; and when the Susquehannocks stand a siege in their home fort and later

raid Iroquoia, Mohawk involvement is minimal. How could such a turnabout occur? Once more the trade was at the heart of developments, but to understand them now we must see the trade at both ends of its cycle.

It behooves the investigator of these years to step back a few paces from the map and take a large view, including Europe in his span of vision. Frontier history in the seventeenth century is the history of two frontiers: one is the frontier in the traditional American sense of the meeting place of Indian and European societies; the other is the frontier in the traditional European sense of a zone between great powers. Trading Indians straddled both these frontiers. They were subject not only to the stresses of ethnocultural contact but also to the struggles of empire builders. Backwoods diplomacy had a way of reflecting, however distortedly, the decisions made in Oslo, Amsterdam, Paris, and London; and this was the era of the Thirty Years War, the Puritan Revolution, the dynastic struggles of France, England, and Holland, and the creation of the Dutch overseas empire from Brazil to Java. Relatively speaking, when Indian turns of policy are examined closely on the assumption that their makers were as rational and self-serving as Europeans, they present a clear and logical pattern; what has made them seem mysterious is the manner in which European scribes recorded Indian policy statements to conform to the Europeans' purposes.

DUTCH POWER

At the marketing end of the Indian trading cycle, the European colonists at the center of everything were the Dutch. New Netherland's whole reason for existence was the Indian trade. When something happened to the Dutch, therefore, whether its source lay in Europe, colonies, or Indian country, its effects reverberated through the tribes. The Susquehannocks were no exception to this rule. If Dutch interests and Dutch activities are examined closely, they reveal the clues needed to understand Susquehannock history.

We may begin with the crisis presented to the traders of New Netherland in 1642. In the background of the crisis lay the fact that so long as the Indians of the far west had had to journey all the way to Three Rivers or Quebec for a French market, the Iroquois could hope to intercept and share in the trade, and the Iroquois would bring their share to Rensselaerswyck. But the French founded Montreal in 1642 and thereby overlapped


Iroquois obstruction. Since the Mohawks would not permit the western tribes to trade directly with Rensselaerswyck, the effect of the founding of Montreal was to cut off western peltry from the Dutch on the Hudson.

The trade of the Connecticut valley had been ruined several years previously by trading posts of New Englanders at Windsor and Hartford. Now, coincidentally with the founding of Montreal, the New Sweden Company was reorganized to compete more aggressively for trade at the Delaware Bay. Governor Johan Printz took charge of the Swedish colony and built a series of blockhouses to intercept Susquehannock trade; in 1644 or 1645, he sent an embassy to Susquehannock country to negotiate a monopoly of the trade for Sweden, thus cutting off western peltry from the Dutch on the Delaware.

At the same time, many of the Indians of the Hudson valley and Long Island grew resentful at Dutch ill treatment, and in 1643 they rose in fierce rebellion. New Netherland was in trouble in every direction. It is no wonder, then, that the Dutch found it politic to make their first treaty of peace and friendship with the Mohawks in 1643, and to renew it in 1645. For the Dutch, these treaties bought Mohawk intervention in their Indian war, which in turn brought the belligerents to a peace treaty. For the Mohawks, the treaties gained the right to trade for guns and ammunition on an unprecedented scale. Dutch arms were the decisive factor in the Iroquois triumph over the Hurons in 1649 and 1650, and there can be little doubt that Dutch logistics also supported the Mohawk attack on the Susquehannocks in 1651–1652.

Though the Dutch mistrusted the Mohawks, fearing lest the latter get out of hand, the
essential fact was that the Mohawks were serving Dutch interests by pursuing their own.

Mohawk peacemaking between the Dutch and the other Indians increased Mohawk prestige. The Mohawk triumph in Huronia promised to divert some of the western furs to Rensselaerswyck. The Mohawk battle against the Susquehannocks was indirectly a battle against the Swedish backers of the Susquehannocks.

While the Mohawks were thus doing Dutch business, the Susquehannocks compounded their offenses against the Dutch by leaguing with yet another hostile power to strengthen themselves against the Dutch-aligned Mohawks. In 1652 the Susquehannocks made a treaty of peace with English Maryland. Now we must remember that 1652 marked the beginning of the first Anglo-Dutch war, and during that war the Delaware Bay Swedes seized their opportunity and the contiguous Dutch real estate. Though the war ended in 1654, the Swedes remained for a while in possession of all of Delaware Bay. They had timed their seizure well, and their Susquehannock allies and trading partners continued to be their main source of strength and profit.

It is not hard to imagine the Dutch being somewhat displeased with the Susquehannocks. Our clue lies in a Swedish document. Governor Johan Rising reported to Sweden that his Lenape neighbors on Delaware Bay had become “very proud”—insufferably so—and that he could do nothing but appease them unless Sweden would send him troops. Appeasement took the form of giving goods on credit to the Lenape, which they then traded to the Susquehannocks for the latter’s peltry; the Lenape completed their brokerage by selling the furs in New Amsterdam for higher prices than the Swedes would pay. That the Susquehannocks did not do their own trading at New Amsterdam bespeaks exclusion from the Dutch market. For the time being, the tributary Lenape (if they still were tributary) had the only access to the best market, and the Susquehannocks’ fortunes—already damaged by their Mohawk war—continued to decline.

Worse was in store. The Dutch reconquered Delaware Bay in 1655, ending New Sweden forever. The Susquehannocks could no longer sustain themselves independently of Dutch friendship. They showed their capitulation in 1658 when they, like the Mohawks before them, exerted influence to end the renewed wars of the Esopus Indians of Hudson River against the Dutch. Reasoning with tribes whom they called tributaries, the Susquehannocks confessed that they had been forced “to submit to the Dutch or hide.” Thus it came about that the Mohawks and Susquehannocks could fight fiercely in 1651, pursue parallel policies in 1658, and join together in the same conference in 1660 to pressure the still refractory Esopus Indians into submission. The turnabout of Mohawk-Susquehannock relations, so mysterious cut of context, appears supremely simple against its background. The Mohawks had not won Susquehannock surrender, but the Dutch had.

From 1658 to 1662 was the period of maximum friendship between the Susquehannocks and Mohawks. The two nations then conceived their diplomatic roles in explicitly similar terms. In 1658 the Mohawks reminded the Dutch at Fort Orange “that at the time of the war against the savages they had gone down to the Manhattans and had done their best to preserve peace; therefore we too [the Dutch] were in duty bound to do the same for them while they promise to exert themselves in future as mediators between us and other savages.” The Mohawks then demanded help against other Iroquois nations who were trying to break through the Mohawk cordon around Dutch markets. In 1662 the Susquehannocks

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31 At the treaty in Fort Amsterdam, 30 Aug., 1645, peace was made with the Indians of the lower Hudson “in the presence of the Maquas [Mohawks] ambassadors, who were solicited to assist in this negotiation, as arbitrators.” N.-Y. Hist. Soc. Collections, 2d series, 1: pp. 275-276. My italics. It appears that the Mohawks had not fought as Dutch allies, although other Indians had been commissioned “to beat and destroy the hostile tribes.” E. B. O’Callaghan, History of New Netherland (2 v., N. Y., 1855) 1: pp. 354-355.


36 Fort Orange Council Minutes, 13 Aug., 1658, N. Y. Col. Docs. 13: pp. 88-89. I use the term “nation” as an expedient to avoid anthropological controversy over the nature of a tribe. Certainly Indian “nations” cannot be properly compared to European nations, but if the term is understood to identify only a self-consciously distinct political entity, it is preferable to the circumlocutions required in its absence.
asserted to the Dutch at Delaware Bay that they had “at all times let themselves be employed to mediate in differences between the Christians and the other savages, to which they still consider themselves obliged.” They, too, wanted supplies on credit with which to fight their (non-Mohawk) enemies among the Iroquois. It appears that the Susquehannocks attempted to control the Delaware market as the Mohawks attempted to control the Hudson market, and both had to fight the more distant Iroquois nations that tried to break their monopolies.

ENGLISH-DUTCH CONFLICT

The incipient partnership was aborted. As the previous rivalry between New Sweden and New Netherland had thrown Indians into conflict, so now a European struggle created new Indian battles. England and Holland revived their former conflict on terms far more formidable to the Dutch than before. New Sweden had confined its competition to the Delaware Bay, but now the English began to press against every part of New Netherland. The English-Dutch struggle threw the Susquehannocks into a dilemma that could be resolved only by catastrophe.

Generally speaking, and on the record, the Dutch were on the defensive; they recognized their inferior numbers and avoided overt actions that could give reasonable offense to the English. However, some of their maneuvers with the Indians under their influence were suspected by the English of being covertly hostile, and probably the suspicions were justified. The more populous English were scattered more widely and divided into a greater number of separate interests and parties. Alike in their aggressive expansionism, Englishmen differed in their specific goals. New England coveted Dutch Long Island and the upper Hudson valley. Virginia and Maryland strove with each other over conflicting Chesapeake Bay claims while the Calverts of Maryland also laid claims to all of Dutch Delaware Bay. In Old England, provincial ambitions were disregarded in plans to seize the whole of New Netherland as a unit. Among all intrigues and struggles, the Indians pursued their own interests as best they were able.

A new crisis began in August, 1659, with English initiatives simultaneously at north and south. To the north a Connecticut delegation appeared at Fort Orange, announcing their plan to found a settlement near the Hudson. To the south, Cecilius Calvert, second Lord Baltimore, sent a delegation to New Amstel to demand the formal surrender of Delaware Bay, giving as reason the terms of his charter. The Dutch reacted cautiously but without conceding anything. At New Amstel they affirmed an Indian purchase right and a further right of long-term possession and habitation; and Governor Stuyvesant reinforced the garrison. After further discussions in 1660, Maryland’s claims were forwarded to Amsterdam. Unfortunately for the Dutch, the firmness of their officials was not matched uniformly by all their colonists. Maryland’s pressure caused “much uncertainty and trouble among the people,” reported the colony’s Vice-Director, who added, “everyone is trying to remove and escape.” One particular escape requires our attention. An Indian trader named Jacob Claeson who, like salesmen everywhere, had nicknamed himself “Jacob, My Friend,” departed mysteriously from New Amstel “with quite a large sum of money, given to him by divers parties to trade with,” and unusual efforts were made by the Dutch to get him back. The money was not their primary concern. Jacob could speak the Susquehannock language—a rare accomplishment for a European—and he had considerable personal influence over those Indians. As the Dutch feared, he soon made himself useful to Maryland.

38 Hunt and Trelease absolve the Dutch of aggressive intentions. Hunt says, “True expansion at Albany did not begin under the Dutch at all, but under the energetic Dongan, in 1684” (p. 172). Trelease remarks that the Dutch “had no ambition to dominate North America” and therefore refrained from wasting resources “in an international contest for continental supremacy” (Indian Affairs, p. 137). These statements leave an unfortunate impression of a sort of peaceful store-minding that was not possible in the conditions of commercial competition at the time. Undoubtedly the Dutch were not territorially expansionist in the region under study, but they did have ambitions to dominate the trade of North America, and they did not hesitate to use all practicable force for that end.

Jacob became especially valuable to Maryland because the Susquehannocks suddenly were thrust into the center of Maryland's foreign policy. The implications of Maryland's 1652 peace treaty with the Susquehannocks probably had not been fully understood by the provincial negotiators. By 1660 they began to understand, at least dimly. In that year the Oneida Iroquois killed five of the Piscataw Indians of Maryland "for being friends" to Maryland and the Susquehannocks. Marylanders at that time made no distinction between one Iroquois nation and another, and they did not understand that this was the year of maximum cooperation between the Iroquois Mohawks and the Susquehannocks, nor would they have cared much if they had understood. As far as the Marylanders were concerned, all the "Northern" Indians were Senecas or "Cynegoes" or some such variant in seventeenth-century spelling, and no fine distinctions were drawn between Mohawks, Oneidas, and so on. As it appeared to the Marylanders in 1660, their protected Indians had been attacked by undifferentiated Iroquois—"Cynegoes"—and they certainly would not put up with such an affront. Maryland promptly declared war on those Cynegoes. The fact that the Marylanders had no very clear idea of the identity of the mysterious marauders had small relevance. As it now appeared to the Marylanders, they were engaged in outright war with the Indian allies of the Dutch of Fort Orange while also engaged in politer but more instructing them to direct hostilities against Senecas or "Cynegoes"—and they "certaine Ennemies, Pyratts, and Robbers," meaning the Dutch.

Prudence dictated prompt countermeasures. Thoughtfully, the Maryland Assembly decided, in April, 1661, that "the Sasquehanoughs are a Bullwarke and Security of the Northern parts of this Province," and within the month their existing treaty of peace was expanded into a full alliance. Jacob was licensed to trade with the Susquehannocks and employed as an official intermediary for the province, and the Indians were provided with substantial help. Besides goods and arms, they were allotted a troop of fifty Englishmen to help garrison their fort. There were, of course, diverse motivations between the allies. The Susquehannocks obviously wanted help for their feud with the (non-Mohawk) Iroquois. Maryland's objectives were to fight the Dutch and the allies of the Dutch, defensively on the exposed Susquehanna River approach to the province, offensively at Delaware Bay. Both of Maryland's objectives were cloaked from the Susquehannocks, who were intended to be manipulated on both fronts.

To the northward, Maryland's commissioner was instructed "to informe yourself of the processe of the Warre" between the Susquehannocks and the Iroquois nations "and if you finde them slack ill itt, to press them discreetly to a vigourous prosecution of it." To the eastward, a Lenape murder of four Marylanders served as a provocation; the province demanded Susquehannock assistance to obtain "satisfaction" from the Lenape. The point of this action was instantly understood at New Amstel. Dutch Secretary Beeckman fretted that if the English go to war with these savages, that all of the territory whence they drive out the same will be seized as being taken from their enemies by the sword. The English will most likely come into our jurisdiction to pursue their enemies without having given previous notice; in case of refusal they would suspect us and treat us in the same manner.

Beeckman had good reason for anxiety. Shortly after he wrote, the Maryland Council sat down to consider a letter from Proprietor Lord Baltimore instructing them to direct hostilities against "certaine Ennemies, Pyratts, and Robbers," meaning the Dutch.

But if the Dutch worried about English aggression, the English were not unmindful of Dutch resources. While Lord Baltimore was abroad, his government showed some discretion. It was easy for Baltimore to bluster valiantly from England. On the Chesapeake, however, one had to act a little more cautiously "lest General1 Styvesant at the Manhatans make an advantage by those Indians [the Iroquois] . . . it being doubted whether
there be a warre betweene Holland and England or not.” This hesitation gave the Dutch a chance to temporize. In September, 1660, Director d’Hinojossa summoned the Passyunk Lenape to meet with Maryland’s Governor Philip Calvert. Lenape Chief Pinna responded and explained that the English had begun the trouble by killing an Indian “upon Easter daye.” Calvert showed unusual willingness to accept the Indian’s shifting of blame. “Satisfaction” was waived, and “Governor Calvert . . . made peace with the aforesaid sachem and merry with d’Hinojossa.” 48

After all this excitement the smallpox epidemic that swept over the Susquehannocks in 1661 and the Iroquois in the following year may have seemed anticlimactic. As if the plague brought too little misery, new wars were in store for the Indians. In Europe, commercial and dynastic struggles began afresh with the Restoration of Charles II to the English throne in 1660 and the assumption in 1661 of personal government by Louis XIV in France. Remote as these monarchs were from the American backwoods, their decisions—filtered, refracted, and distorted by local conditions—began to enter into the pattern of Indian politics. Their first effect came with the heightening of competition between England and the Dutch Republic. Defensively, in 1662, the Dutch allied themselves to France. In 1663 the Indians living between Dutch Fort Orange and French Montreal undertook large-scale attacks on other Indians allied respectively to the English of New England. The attacking Iroquois could have obtained their armament only from the French and Dutch; as both these European peoples had excellent sources of information among the Iroquois, it seems fair to conclude that their officialdom had some notion of where their powder and ball was destined to be shot. One must rely on pattern and inference; the direct evidence discloses only a murky picture of activities whose difficulty of interpretation has left them usually abandoned by historians as a chaotic pile of mere data.

IROQUOIS DEFEATS

The raids are on the record. The first of the Iroquois campaigns of 1663 was that of 800 Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas against the Susquehannocks. The Iroquois besieged the home fort of the Susquehannocks toward the end of May. All but 80 of the Susquehannocks’ fighting men were at home awaiting the attack. Since their total after the battle was 700, and they were joined in their fort by 100 Lenape, we may infer that the attackers and defenders were fairly even in number. As sieges go, this one was of remarkably short duration. It lasted less than a week before the beaten Iroquois headed home.49

Three months later Jesuit Father Lalemant was reporting “sad havoc” from smallpox in nearly deserted Iroquois villages with only half-tilled fields. Never again was an expedition as mighty as that of 1663 launched against the Susquehannocks. Not only did the Iroquois lose against their southern enemies, but they were also defeated in their second major expedition of 1663, in the east. In the fall of the year, a party of Mohawks, Onondagas, and Oneidas attacked the Sokoki Indians of Maine. After an initial repulse the Mohawks wanted to call quits, but the others overruled them and the party returned to be calamitously beaten. Far from being the savage rulers of a wilderness empire, the Iroquois now came “within two fingerbreaths of total destruction” from the accumulated effects of famine, disease, and war.50

Yet the fighting continued. Indians of New England attacked both the Mohawks and the Dutch. If English instigation was not behind the raids as the Dutch believed, English armament certainly was required to launch them.51 In the


49 Two distinct and different versions of this battle exist in the sources. The Iroquois version, as told to Jesuit missionaries, blames defeat on the European-type fortification of the Susquehannocks and the failure of a stratagem to lure them out of their walls. The Susquehannock version (less frequently used in the histories) sounds less melodramatic and more probable in its details. It matches approximately equal forces of Iroquois and Susquehannock warriors, and it has the Iroquois abandon their enterprise after a few sallies from the fort had convinced them of probable failure. Jerome Lalemant, Quebec, 4 Sept., 1663, Jesuit Relations 48: pp. 77-79; Andries Hudde to Dir. Stuyvesant, Altena, 29 May, 1663, N. Y. Col. Docs. 12: p. 430; Beeckman to Stuyvesant, Altena, 6 June, 1663, ibid. 12: p. 431; Susquehannock Chief Wastahandow, 27 Sept., 1663, Md. Arch. (Upper House) 1: pp. 471-472.

50 Jerome Lalemant, 30 Aug., 1664, Jesuit Relations, 49: pp. 147-149.

south the Iroquois maintained some momentum. The Oneidas conducted a new raid into the Chesapeake Bay region, and their depredations enraged the always choleric aristocrats of Maryland. The Susquehannocks were battle-weary. "Wee know," wrote Jacob, My Friend, that the Susquehannocks "would willingly Imbrace a peace if Obtained, but are unwilling (through height of Spirit) to sue for it." Jacob besought Governor Charles Calvert to authorize the negotiation of a general peace "which by every one, wee thinke, is much required and most earnestly desired." Calvert's answer was a redundant declaration of war specifically against the Oneidas who, as Iroquois ("Cynegoes") were already among Maryland's formally declared enemies.52

**ENGLISH CONQUEST**

The squabbles of small powers had to be conducted within the limits set by greater powers. While Indians and provinces fought and intrigued, Charles II of England "granted" all of New Netherland to his brother James, Duke of York. James commissioned a small fleet of three vessels; it cowed New Amsterdam into capitulation on 27 August, 1664, and won Fort Orange in September; on the first of October, Dutch Fort Amstel on the Delaware Bay surrendered.53 Just as the demise of New Sweden had transformed backwoods diplomacy, so the conquest of New Netherland now restricted even more sharply the number of genuine choices possible for the Indians. In a manner of speaking, the world of the Mohawks might seem to have come to an end with New Netherland. Reduced by disease, beaten in battle, and now deprived of the fundamental prop for their whole system of external politics, they sued for peace.54

Now, surely, peace ought to have come to the embroiled tribes. America was now under English rule from Maine to Carolina; it would seem a simple thing for the conquering Englishmen, after having eliminated their competitors, to stabilize and pacify the tribes. To think so, however, is to reveal the nationalistic preconceptions of our own era. Neither King Charles nor Duke James undertook the reduction of New Netherland just to strew benevolence over the provinces. The King's patent to his brother embraced lands claimed by Connecticut and Massachusetts, and the King instructed his commissioners to investigate a reputed grant by Indians to the Crown of "a large tract of ground about the Narragansetts Bay." If the Indian grant were to prove true, the commissioners were to "seize upon the same in our Name and the same tract of land shall bee hereafter called the King's Province."55 At the opposite side of New Netherland, Baltimore's claims on Delaware Bay were also encountered by the English conquerors. The royal commissioners instructed their representative to declare to "my Lord Baltimore's son" that "the reduction of the place being at his Majesties expense, you have commands to keep possession thereof for his Majesties own behoofe and right."56 It is hardly surprising, under the circumstances, that Puritans and Marylanders greeted the conquest of New Netherland with less than joy. The conquest had not eliminated their powerful competitor so much as it had substituted a still greater power in the same relationship. Though sovereignty changed, the functions and roles of New Netherland continued to be performed by New York.

For the Indians, of course, there could be no question about the necessity of adapting to the newcomers. The Mohawks instantly offered alliance and asked New York's Governor Nicolls to mediate between them and their multitude of enemies. Nicolls agreed to try to make peace for them with "the Nations down the River," but he could make no guarantees of peace with other provinces.57

As things turned out, Nicolls was unable to prevent Indian disruption even within his own province. The Mahicans renewed a dormant ancient feud with the Mohawks, and were able to find a source of European support. Though both the English and the old Dutch inhabitants of Albany combined to enforce Mahican compliance with Mohawk pleas for peace, their edict was obeyed only so long as the time required for the Mahicans

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to make a new alliance with the French.\textsuperscript{58} As the policies of Charles II had been aimed at eliminating the Dutch power from America, the policies of Louis XIV were aimed at eliminating the Iroquois. French alliance with the Mahicans was only one of Louis's measures. When Anglo-Dutch war was renewed, France joined the Dutch in 1666. The Bourbon monarch also decided "totally to exterminate" the Iroquois, and sent a regiment of veteran troops and reorganized his government of Canada to take the offensive.\textsuperscript{59} Once more, the Iroquois were surrounded by enemies. In 1666 a French expeditionary force burned the Mohawk villages and food supply, and the Susquehannocks destroyed an Onondaga army. Meanwhile the Mahicans "infested the roads" of the Iroquois so successfully that an Onondaga sachem pleaded with the French to call them off.\textsuperscript{60} A Jesuit father reported that the Oneidas were continually alarmed to take the offensive. In 1666 a French expeditionary force burned the Mohawk villages and food supply, and the Susquehannocks destroyed an Onondaga army. Meanwhile the Mahicans "infested the roads" of the Iroquois so successfully that an Onondaga sachem pleaded with the French to call them off.\textsuperscript{60} A Jesuit father reported that the Oneidas were continually alarmed in their villages by both Mahicans and Susquehannocks, and "a panic of terror" swept over one village on the mere false rumor that a Susquehannock army was approaching.\textsuperscript{61}

In the midst of all this the voices of peace were hard to hear. Having once embroiled the tribes with each other, the Europeans found that only united efforts could suppress the tumult. Governor Nicolls of New York attempted to get peace for the Mohawks in the south, but Governor Calvert of Maryland ignored him. Nicolls' successor tried to enlist the support of Connecticut's Governor Winthrop to calm the Mahicans, but negotiations dragged on and on. The Onondagas had been so badly beaten by the Susquehannocks that they made revenge an obsession, and when a Susquehannock chief brought proposals of peace to the Cayugas in 1670 the Onondagas instigated his murder.\textsuperscript{62} It seemed to be a time exemplifying Thomas Hobbes' "war of all against all," but it was no Hobbesian "state of nature." In the last analysis the Indians remained dependent on European trade goods, and wherever the Europeans could finally submerge their own strife, they had it within their power to stop Indian warfare. In 1670 a Susquehannock sachem dinned this into the heads of some stubborn Lenape "and showed them, here live Christians and there live Christians; declaring to them that as they were surrounded by Christians, if they went to war, where would they get powder and ball?"\textsuperscript{63}

**TEMPORARY PEACE**

There came at last a brief moment on the continent of North America when the occupying great powers came to an understanding. France switched sides. In 1670 Louis XIV and Charles II made a secret personal treaty of alliance, and in 1672 France and England joined in war against the Netherlands. In the same year Canada and New York suppressed the feud between the Mohawks and the Mahicans. When the Mahicans proposed an expedition against the Mohawks, the French rejected it. The Mohawks heard of the proposal and ran to Albany. "We have accepted the peace which has been made by you people," they said. "Speak with the Mahikanders so that they come and do as we do." Albany's magistrates promised to "take care that the peace will remain steadfast" and to "force the Mahikanders to come here," continuing with the promise of explicit sanctions: "if they come to slay one of you, then they will see that they will have to deal with us, and we will revenge it." Peace ensued. It was indeed so reliable a peace that Mohawks could afford to get roaring drunk in Albany and stagger back home along paths formerly overrun by Mahican bushwhackers. On the French side, missionary Father Lamberville thought it was a "baleful peace" that created such opportunities for continued drunkenness, but Governor Frontenac enforced it. Thus the Indian allies of France's colony and England's colony were pacified immediately when the empires leagued.\textsuperscript{64}

The alliance between Stuart and Bourbon was


\textsuperscript{60}François Le Mercier, Quebec, 20 Aug., 1668, *Jesuit Relations* 51: p. 243; letter to J. B. Van Rensselaer, 26 July, 1664, *Correspondence of Jeremias Van Rensselaer*, p. 338.

\textsuperscript{61}Relation of 1668–69, *Jesuit Relations* 52: pp. 147, 175–177.


not matched by amity between Stuart and Calvert. Intermittent and desultory war continued between James Stuart’s Iroquois and Charles Calvert’s Susquehannocks, to the apparent disadvantage of the Iroquois. In 1672 a war party of Senecas and Cayugas was routed by equal numbers of Susquehannock adolescents. In 1673 the Iroquois appealed for help from their new friends in Canada; they “earnestly exhorted” Governor Frontenac to assist them against the Susquehannocks because “it would be a shame for him to allow his children to be crushed, as they saw themselves about to be . . . they not having the means of going to attack [the Susquehannocks] in their fort, which was very strong, nor even of defending themselves if the others came to attack them in their villages.” Frontenac put them off without a commitment, and the odds are long that he did not arm them covertly: first, because it was no time for the French to be meddling with Indian conflicts deep within English territory; secondly, because Frontenac’s government was suffering from an acute shortage of munitions for its own defense, as he reported to France in November, 1674.65

This is a significant date. According to the usual sort of comment about the Susquehannocks, they are supposed to have been badly beaten by the Iroquois sometime between 1672 and 1675. We have seen what shape the Iroquois were in until 1672. The French records make it clear that the Iroquois could not possibly have launched a successful attack before July, 1673, when they met with Frontenac; and they could not have obtained any considerable supply of arms from the French thereafter through November, 1674. Even if we suspect Frontenac of wanting to arm the Iroquois clandestinely, we must conclude that he could not have done so through the winter of 1674–1675; because of the winter freeze on the St. Lawrence, it was impossible for Frontenac’s appeal for an arms shipment from France to be answered before the spring thaw. The importance of all this arises from the fact that the Susquehannocks abandoned their old village and fort on the Susquehanna River in February, 1675, to retire into Maryland.66 Assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the retirement had been forced by Iroquois pressure, the Iroquois would have had to get arms from somewhere besides Canada. Was it Albany, then? There are excellent reasons for rejecting this possibility also, but they must be seen as part of the whole pattern of events at Chesapeake and Delaware bays.

THE WHOREKILL RAIDS

Let it be remembered that the Calverts of Maryland had claimed Delaware Bay while it was in the possession of the Dutch. After Dutch surrender, Delaware Bay came under the jurisdiction of New York, and Maryland’s claims had to be set aside for a while. They were not abandoned, however. In 1672 Lord Baltimore concluded that the time had come to act. He sent a party of thirty horsemen—a large troop for the time and place—to plunder the inhabitants of the Whorekills, a small but strategic community at the mouth of the bay (Lewes, Delaware).67 New York’s bumbling Governor Francis Lovelace was incredulous and then apoplectic at the news, but Baltimore had timed the raid with luck.68 England and the Netherlands were at war again; soon a Dutch fleet returned both New York and the Delaware Bay to Dutch government, and thus removed Lovelace from any power to chastise Baltimore. But Baltimore wanted the Whorekills for himself, not for the Dutch, and in December, 1673, he struck again. He sent forty troopers this time, under the command of Captain Thomas Howell, who took the place by a simple show of force. Howell entertained himself by torturing a merchant into confessions.

fessing the location of his peltry hoard, and by committing sundry other "barbarous cruelties." On Christmas Eve he summoned all the Whore-kills inhabitants together, took their arms from them, and informed them of his instructions from Baltimore to destroy everything on fifteen minutes' notice—"that he must not Leave one stick standing." His men set fire to the place, standing guard to prevent anyone from rescuing even a single possession. The bewildered people, their boats and horses taken away as well as their arms and food, and with some of their women pregnant, stood aghast. Survivors recalled that "the Indians that Lived here about wept when they saw the spoil that the Inhabitants had suffered by their owne native Country men." When news of the attack finally reached Governor General Colve, the new chief of the revived New Netherland, he ordered immediate "means of support" to be given to the victims, English as well as Dutch. In his outrage he further ordered "proper arrangements" to prevent "such cruel tyranny" thereafter, and he put the inhabitants of Delaware Bay into a state of military emergency. Now it was the turn of the Lord Baltimore's people to feel fear. The Dutch of Manhattan were far away, and the Dutch of Delaware Bay were weak; but, given some prodding and arms, the Indian allies of the Dutch might become terrible indeed, and the Indians were in a highly volatile state. Continual seizure by Virginians and Marylanders of Indian lands had led some of the Lenape sachems to contemplate preventive war to hold their own at Delaware Bay. A couple of Englishmen had been killed by Indians. Before the Dutch reconquest the English had decided to wage an Indian war in the spring of 1673, and they had been making plans for it when the Dutch overthrew their government. One suggestion that had been made by the Bay Englishmen to their distant Governor in New York is worth noting. If possible, they had asked, fifty or sixty "North Indians" should be hired "who will doe more than 200 men in such a warr." Such notions would not have escaped the attention of the Marylanders; and certainly, if the English at the Delaware might have brought in Iroquois to attack other Indians, there could be small reason to doubt that the Dutch might bring them in to attack the Marylanders with whom the Iroquois were already formally at war.

MARYLAND'S NEW INDIAN POLICY

We have to distinguish between the recorded facts and what the facts would appear to be to the people of that time. No record shows, and no recorded event suggests, that the Dutch did actually arm and instigate the Iroquois in this particular situation. But let us see how it looked to contemporaries. In 1673 there was an Indian population around the bays that had become embittered against the English. There was Dutch Governor Colve at Manhattan, under strong provocation, proclaiming defense measures at Delaware Bay. Governor Colve was closely allied by treaty to the Iroquois Indians and presumably could supply them with weapons. The use of Indians for covert warfare had long been accepted as one of the facts of colonial life, and Maryland was still in a state of war with the Iroquois. It seems reasonable to suppose that Lord Baltimore's people began to be nervous about the Iroquois. A pair of dates are on the record: in January, 1674, Governor Colve proclaimed his state of emergency; and on the first day of June, 1674, the Maryland Assembly voted unanimously that it was "necessarie that a Peace be Concluded" with the Iroquois.

Having made that decision, the Assembly had to face up to its implications. Rather, the Lower House of the Assembly had to be manipulated by the Upper House to accept the implications. Maryland's executive branch of government consisted of a Governor and Council. In the legislative process, the executive Council's members sat as an Upper House to dominate the elective Lower House. Thus the Upper House was always privy to executive plans and decisions which were disclosed to the Lower House at discretion and with something less than total candor. Thus, when the Lower House had safely voted to seek peace with the Iroquois, the Upper House released some previously undisclosed information. Its process of disclosure was to initiate sequel legislation to empower the Governor and Council to make and finance war even outside the provincial boundaries

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"forasmuch as that Peace [with the Iroquois] may bring a Warre with the Sasquahannoughs."  

This was a jolt. Two weeks dragged on while the Lower House withheld its consent. Final agreement, when it came, included reference to "credible Informations of the many murmurs and Outrages committed upon the persons and Estates of divers of the good People of this Province in Baltemore County by the Susquehanna Indians and other their Confederate Indians by them countenanced and protected contrary to the Articles of Peace." No bill of particulars accompanied the accusation. Curiously the charge was advanced not so much to justify punishing the Susquehannocks as to justify making peace with the Iroquois. It was worded neatly for Baltimore's maximum advantage in defense or offense, for its mention of the Susquehannocks' "Confederate Indians" meant the Lenape, and an expedition against the Lenape would be a march on Delaware Bay. Having made its findings so conveniently, the Assembly voted a supply for the expenses of either peace or war.14

SUSQUEHANNOCK REMOVAL INTO MARYLAND

A hiatus ensues in the records, which has to be filled by inference from subsequent events. Governor Calvert held a conference "at Mattapanie"—no further information about it is given. Afterwards, in February, 1675, the Susquehannocks—all of them—showed up at St. Mary's in Maryland "and being asked their Business they desired to know what part of the Province Should be allotted for them to live upon." The language of the record is startlingly abrupt. Indians were normally more polite, especially when asking for favors. Even more strangely, the Upper House formally asked the Lower House's opinion about what to do with the Indians, and the Lower House raised never a hint of seizing and punishing these presumed murderers who had placed themselves so artlessly in the hands of the government. Rather confusedly the Lower House suggested sending the Indians to "a Place above the falls of Potomack, there being time enough . . . to clear Ground enough to Plant Corn this year which is the only thing they Seem to desire to live among the Neighbour Indians for." The Susquehannocks, "after Some tedious Debate," agreed to go as far as the first falls of the Potomoc where they took up residence in an abandoned Piscatawa fort.75

This is the retirement of the Susquehannocks that has been variously explained as the consequence of defeat or pressure by the Iroquois. Such explanations rest solely on extrapolation and imagination; there is not a scintilla of evidence in any contemporary document of a major battle with the Iroquois at this time, nor is there any contemporary signal of increased Iroquois strength from the miserable state they had confessed to Frontenac in 1673; and, as we have seen, there was no means for them to get arms from the French throughout the winter of 1674-1675. Only the Dutch might possibly have given the required kind of logistic support, and nothing indicates that they did. Actually, instead of noting a rise in hostilities between the Iroquois and the Susquehannocks, Maryland's Lower House expressed suspicions of the two nations' having "private Correspondence together." The enigma is solved for us by a remark of William Penn in a retrospective debate in 1684 with Lord Baltimore's nephew and acting Governor, George Talbot. Penn charged that the Susquehannocks had been "betrayed out of theire Lives by Inviteing them downe among the English," and Talbot, who recorded the dialogue, put the remark down without challenge.76 This apparently is the explanation for the mysterious meeting of Charles Calvert with the Susquehannocks "at Mattapanie" before the Susquehannocks came into Maryland. It appears that Calvert gave the Susquehannocks an ultimatum to withdraw from their home fort and retire into Maryland. Failure to comply would be interpreted as grounds for war. By thus forcing the Susquehannocks to retire into Maryland, Calvert could clear the way to make peace with

73 Minutes, 19 Feb., 1675, Md. Arch. (Upper House) 2: pp. 428-430. No date is given for the Mattapanie conference. I have been unable to find other reference to it. 74 Conference between Penn and Talbot, New Castle, 1684, Maryland Historical Magazine 3 (1908): p. 25. Penn's remark is confirmed by a paper of Charles Calvert, 15 May, 1682. Calvert, then third Lord Baltimore, warned two treaty negotiators not to "abandon our friend Indians" for fear of causing them "to break the peace in revenge of our breach of Articles and Deserting them, as wee see the small remnant of the Susquehannahs have done." Instructions to Henry Coursey and Philemon Lloyd, 15 May, 1682, Md. Arch. (Council) 17: p. 98.
the Iroquois, and with the Iroquois nullified he would be able to renew his effort to conquer Delaware Bay.\textsuperscript{77}

But—what embarrassment!—In November, 1674, an English fleet once again took New Netherland, and once again both the Iroquois Indians and the Delaware Bay came into the government of the Duke of York. By the time the Susquehannocks had responded, in February, 1675, to their "invitation" to reside in Maryland, the reason for inviting them had ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{78} Now there was nothing left to do except go through with the comedy of assigning a place in the province for the Susquehannocks to live, and so it came about that the Lower House found itself so abruptly consulted.

\textbf{ATTACK ON THE SUSQUEHANNOCK FORT}

Once more, as in 1672, European quarrels in the New World were temporarily suspended, and once more the Indians reflected the lull by relaxing their own disputes. As the Susquehannocks settled in their new home where Piscataway Creek flows into the Potomac, an Indian mediator started from New York to initiate peace between the Iroquois and the Susquehannocks; and the Lenape subsided on the Delaware.\textsuperscript{79} Again the

\textsuperscript{77} Apparently the impression got abroad in Maryland that the invitation to the Susquehannocks had been offered by the Piscatawan Indians. Even if this had been the formal procedure, it would in no way change the realities of the situation. The Piscatawans would not dare to dispose of invitations to Maryland without full authority from the provincial government. "Complaint from Heaven with a Hue and crye," 1676, \textit{Md. Arch.} (PRO) 5: p. 134. This "Complaint from Heaven" has been dismissed as the product of wild imaginings. It is certainly garbled, but it ought not to be ignored. It shows how Baltimore's Protestant opposition saw his Indian policy through the screen of official censorship and misinformation.

\textsuperscript{78} The relevant events on record are as follows:

14 Jan., 1674. Proclamation by Dutch Governor Colve of military preparation in Delaware Bay.

1 June, 1674. Maryland Assembly resolves necessity of peace with Iroquois.

16 June, 1674. Md. Assembly enacts support for expenses of peace or war.

Date unknown. Baltimore, at Mattapanie, invites Susquehannocks into Maryland.


19 Feb., 1675. Susquehannocks arrive at St. Mary's.

\textsuperscript{79} Conference minutes, 28 June, 1675; Andros to Baltimore, 15 May, 1675, \textit{Third Annual Report of the State Historian of the State of New York}, 1897 (N. Y., 1898), pp. 345-346, 314. Location of Susquehannocks: Alice imminent prospect of peace went aglimmering. In September, 1675, a militia of backwoodsmen from Maryland and Virginia laid siege to the new Potomac fort of the Susquehannocks. Their reasons have been disputed; scholars agree fairly well that a chain of violent events in Virginia's back country, for which the Susquehannocks were not responsible, had led the militia to seek revenge on Indians regardless of the guilt or innocence of particular persons or groups. Authorities also agree on the main points of what happened at the fort. The Indian chiefs were twice called out to parley. On their second appearance, five were seized in violation of their safe conduct; they were murdered on the orders of Maryland's Captain Truman, urged or abetted by Virginia's Colonel John Washington.\textsuperscript{80} The atrocity has not been condoned in either Virginia or Maryland, but considerable energy has been expended in each place to prove that primary responsibility lay in the other. It is only fair to add that Maryland's Assembly tried and convicted Captain Truman for his part in the affair, though he seems never to have suffered any actual penalty except a security bond; Washington was not inconvenienced in any such way.\textsuperscript{81}

The besieged Susquehannocks, despite inferiority in numbers and the loss of their chiefs, held out for six more weeks. Then, one dark night, they all walked quietly through the English camp, taking toll of ten sleepers on the way, after which they launched a fury of revenge on the isolated


\textsuperscript{80} Wilcomb E. Washburn, \textit{The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia} (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1957), pp. 20-23. This is the best book on the subject. A different interpretation is given in \textit{Richard L. Morton, Colonial Virginia} (2 v., Chapel Hill, N. C., 1960) 2: 231-233. Morton finds that the Susquehannock chiefs were murdered "against the advice and without the knowledge of Colonel Washington and his Virginians." Morton's harsh criticism of Washburn's book should be read in light of the fact that Morton relies on the self-serving depositions of Virginians involved in the massacre, giving them full faith and credit; he takes no notice of the contradictory Maryland sources.

\textsuperscript{81} Minutes and depositions in Truman's case, \textit{Md. Arch.} (Upper House) 2: pp. 481-483, 485-486, 494, 500-501, 504, 511-513. Baltimore lifted Truman's bond later, saying, "I have no desire that the said Truman should imagine I have the least malice or prejudice to his person . . . what I formerly did order was only occasioned by the great exigency of affaires att that tyme." Baltimore to Notley, 10 Aug., 1678, \textit{Md. Arch.} (Council) 15: pp. 182-183.
cabins of the Virginia backwoods. Governor Berkeley's rule was overthrown by militant back settlers led by a demagogue named Nathaniel Bacon. After the fashion of demagogues, Bacon promised to do the impossible. He took a troop of volunteers on a campaign to exterminate the Susquehannocks. They did not find the Susquehannocks, but they relieved their frustrations by massacring nearby allied Indians unfortunate enough to be resident on attractive real estate. Bacon solved the awkward legal problems raised by his insurrection by dying of natural causes in 1676.\(^{82}\) The historical problems had just begun. 

On the one side the sordid story of treachery, avarice, and slaughter was converted through the mystique of the frontier into a heroic saga of primitive democracy aborning, and Bacon—a criminal aristocrat living in enforced exile—was apotheosized into a sort of Siegfried of the settlers. On the other side the Iroquois got the blame for defeating and dispersing the Susquehannocks.

**ANDROS' INDIAN POLICIES**

In order to get the Susquehannocks out of the Virginia wilderness, we must take a roundabout path back through New York and take notice of some of the other turmoils of that unquiet era. In doing so we shall have to study well a statesman damned by New England and praised by William Penn (who, of course, was also damned by New England). Late in 1674 the Duke of York commissioned Edmund Andros to govern the territories reconquered from the Dutch. Andros, as Penn later remarked with great judiciousness, "tho he was not without objection... certainly did great things."\(^{83}\) Andros took office in a New York where Englishmen were scarce and their scarcity was not regretted. To his north were the chronically hostile French whom he had to keep at bay without provocation. To his east were the Puritan colonies of Connecticut and Massachusetts which, because of Andros' commission to govern lands claimed by them, were more acutely hostile than the French. To his south was Baltimore's Maryland with its dedication to the seizure of the Delaware Bay colonies.

Indian troubles revived everywhere. We have seen already the turmoil in the south. The Mohawk and Hudson valleys were tensely and uncertainly testing the viability of the enforced peace between Mohawk and Mahican. Perpetual skirmish and ambush remained the rule between the Iroquois and the Indians in alliance with the French. The Connecticut valley was soon to experience the most violent explosion of all; Andros had been in office less than eight months when King Philip's War turned New England's back settlements into shambles. The job that faced Andros was to bring peace to every point of the compass with the resources of a sparsely populated province in which he was a stranger who could not even speak the mother tongue of the majority of his own officials. He performed this Herculean task by a typically British, thoroughly pragmatic constitutional revolution. Working from the base already established by the Dutch, Andros took the materials he had at hand and created the "covenant chain" of subsequent fame in the history of the Indian peoples of the middle colonies. At the climactic moment of the process the Susquehannocks temporarily lost their legal identity as a nation.

Andros was a systematic man. On assuming office he began to confer separately with the more important chiefs of the Indian communities under his jurisdiction, starting with the nearest. By the end of April, 1675, he had concluded agreements of peace and protection with the tribes of the Hudson valley, Long Island, and northern New Jersey, and he was ready to manage the troubles on the Delaware.\(^{84}\) Journeying to Delaware Bay, he gained a treaty with the Lenape and a special friend in Renowickam, their "Emperor." He took the occasion to dispatch a politely veiled warning to Lord Baltimore to refrain from further attacks on the Delaware colonists.\(^{85}\) This was no sooner done than New England exploded, and Andros had to rush all about the Government to keep matters well and quiet. Then came the attack of Maryland and Virginia on the Susquehannocks.


with its chain of calamities. Andros' great fear was that all the Indians from Canada to Virginia would unite in a showdown war with the English; and when he suddenly discovered that King Philip was wintering near Albany he knew that his moment of decision was at hand. If the Mohawks were to join Philip, as some of the Mahicans had done already, New England's prospects would worsen critically. If the Lenape in the south were to join their old allies, the Susquehannocks, for an assault on Maryland, the cost of suppressing them would be high indeed. In either case the damages to the fur trade—the sine qua non of New York's existence—might be irreparable. In this crisis the Mohawks and the Lenape remained constant, each nation in its own way. The Lenape simply kept the peace that Andros had negotiated with Renowickam. The Mohawks, armed and directed by Andros, suddenly attacked King Philip and drove him from his upper Hudson sanctuary among the Mahicans into the reach of New England. He passed on a Mohawk invitation for the Susquehannocks to move in as guests. All was to be entirely as the Susquehannocks themselves desired: "They should say whether they will come into the Government or no. If they will not, it is well; if they will, he will make provision for them." No wonder the Susquehannocks departed "well satisfied," but they had not been empowered to conclude a treaty so they returned for consultation with their "folks" living in sanctuary among Renowickam's Lenape. Some how they spread word of Andros' proffered protection, and

ANDROS' PROTECTION

With the same outlook and policies in the southern part of his jurisdiction, Andros' first reaction to the Susquehannock dispersion was dismay. He informed Maryland of King Philip's War, then newly begun, and warned of the danger of a universal rising of the tribes against Englishmen everywhere. At the first opportunity he tried to repair the damage done by the southern colonies. When Delaware Bay's Captain Cantwell reported the presence of a Susquehannock somewhere on the bay, Andros scolded Cantwell for failing to make immediate contact with the Indians. Cantwell exerted himself and produced two Susquehannock sachems in New York on 2 June, 1676. Andros came directly to the point with them. If the Susquehannocks would return to live "anywhere" within his government, he said, "they shall be welcome and protected from their Enemies." He promised not only that the Mohawks and Senecas would be at peace with them, but also to make peace for them with Virginia and Maryland. He passed on a Mohawk invitation for the Susquehannocks to move in as guests. All was to be entirely as the Susquehannocks themselves desired: "They should say whether they will come into the Government or no. If they will not, it is well; if they will, he will make provision for them." No wonder the Susquehannocks departed "well satisfied," but they had not been empowered to conclude a treaty so they returned for consultation with their "folks" living in sanctuary among Renowickam's Lenape. Some how they spread word of Andros' proffered protection, and


87 Examination of T. Warner, 25 Feb., 1675, A Narrative of the Causes which led to Philip's Indian War
their scattered people began to drift in, some to the old fort on the Susquehanna River, others to join the nucleus on the Delaware.

Andros' intervention was far from welcome in Maryland. The Marylanders wanted "their" Indians under their own control. For the same commercial reasons that Andros wanted the Susquehannocks in New York, and in spite of all the past bloodshed, Baltimore wanted them in Maryland. In any event he did not want them under the control of a province that he intended to raid again. Opportunity to counter Andros' measures came by way of the trading post of Jacob, My Friend, at the head of Chesapeake Bay. (The trader's involvement has been obscured by successive changes of name. Once Claeson, then Clawson, he now appears in the records as Jacob Young.) Jacob had his own commercial reasons for keeping the Susquehannocks nearby; if they were to leave for Mohawk country, his trade would go with them. Amid all the intrigue, Jacob became still another factor as he set himself to work at cross purposes with Andros and in behalf of Baltimore. While Andros tried to get the Susquehannocks to come to New York, Young tried to get them down to St. Mary's in Maryland. His long friendship and influence with them, and some highly suspect influence with Andros' commander at New Castle, won the decision. On 4 August, 1676, the Susquehannocks came with Young and New Castle's Captain Cantwell to the head of the Chesapeake to send a message to the Maryland Council. The Indians asked for "peace and trade as formerly with the English." The Council observed that Andros had already made peace between the Susquehannocks and the Iroquois "so that now they are at Ease and out of our reach." But "this notwithstanding," the Susquehannocks seemed to desire "to treate of a peace with the English in Generall." It was a "blessing from God unhoped for," according to the Council. "Wee thought it not to be Slighted." A safe conduct was dispatched at once.93

Apparently a truce was negotiated to give the Maryland Council time to consult the province's allies, but this was far from the end of the affair. Neither the European friends of the Susquehannocks nor the Indian friends of Maryland were willing to let the peace be consummated in the proposed manner. Captain Cantwell, in the first place, had flouted Andros' policy by even permitting negotiations directly between Maryland and the Susquehannocks. Cantwell and Jacob Young at the head of the Chesapeake had sent the Susquehannocks' solicitation for peace with Maryland on August 4; on the same day in New York, Andros and his Council resolved that Cantwell should not "promise or engage anything" but should refer the Indians to Andros himself to handle Maryland as well as the Iroquois. Cantwell's job was to be strictly limited to informing the Marylanders of his commands from Andros. To justify this procedure, Andros remarked that the greatest service he could do the Marylanders was "to take off the said Indyans lest going to the Mohawks and Senecas, they might induce them to make inroads upon the Christians, which none of us could remedy." Cantwell was further to offer a present to the Susquehannocks, in Andros' name, to be delivered explicitly on the Delaware rather than on the Chesapeake.92

It would seem that Captain Cantwell was not quite a good and faithful servant. Not only did he act prematurely (perhaps on purpose) to create an undesirable commitment, but he raised an alarm about an Indian danger that Andros found to be nonexistent; and apparently he did not inform Andros of his and Jacob Young's excursion to Maryland. Whatever he and Young were up to, they failed; the truce with Maryland could not be developed into a treaty because of unexpected complications made by still another set of interested parties. When Maryland's Council informed its allied Indians of the Susquehannock peace overture, the allied Piscatawa and Mattawoman tribes objected strenuously. They had joined the Maryland militia in pursuit of fleeing Susquehannock bands—in all likelihood they had been militarily more effective than the militia—and they feared retaliation. They wanted the war continued until the Susquehannocks could not possibly survive as a serious threat. Faced with this opposition, the Maryland Council asked whether the allies would march under Maryland's officers against the Susquehannocks in their rebuilt fort. The allies agreed.93 From subsequent developments, one can see that this reply opened an interesting vista to the Marylanders. They had never given up the hope of seizing the Delaware Bay for themselves, and they had often played with the notion of ex-

cusing invasion on the grounds that they were pursuing hostile Indians into the Delaware valley. Their new maneuvers indicate that their hope was still alive.

ANDROS' ULTIMATUMS

On the other side, Andros seems to have gotten wind somehow of the peculiar activities of his deputy on the Delaware. With his usual decisiveness, he dismissed Cantwell from office and commissioned Captain John Collier as replacement. To Collier, Andros gave fresh instructions. A polite but genuine ultimatum was to be delivered to Maryland. Either the Susquehannocks were to be actually received within that province or some acceptable reason for keeping them dangling in an unconfirmed truce would have to be given to Andros. Otherwise, Andros would take the Indians himself “rather than hazard their being obliged to refuge with a grudge and rancour in their hearts, further off, if not wholly out of our reach.” Collier was instructed further to take another, somewhat ambiguous, message to the Susquehannocks. As many of those people as could be persuaded were to be brought to New York. The rest were to be given a new and ominous warning that “though they shall receive no harme from the Government” Andros would not “now undertake to Secure them from others where they are.”

Andros now wrote directly to the deputy governor of Maryland. “I have some interest with the Mohawks and Senecas,” he stated, “which can best deale with them.” At such points the twentieth century despairs of the seventeenth’s bad habit of using pronouns without definite referents. Who were the “them” who could be dealt with? Did he mean that his interest could deal with Mohawks and Senecas? Or did he mean that the Mohawks and Senecas could best deal with the Susquehannocks? At least, Andros was definite, if not entirely clear, on one point. “I shall be ready to use all fitting means for the best,” he wrote; it might have been either a promise or a threat. So far as the Iroquois were concerned, Andros expressed a fear that the Susquehannocks might soon “necessarily Submit to the Mohawks and Senecas, which passionately desire it.” Such a submission, he thought, might prove “of a bad consequence.” He appears to mean that the consequences would be bad for Maryland. He pushed the Marylanders to reply. Was the “late Peace” with the Susquehannocks “Sufficient”? Should the Susquehannocks be permitted to remain where they were, or should they be removed?

EXPLANATION OF THE INTRIGUES

We must make a choice of motives in order to interpret these cryptic utterances. However, if we assume that Maryland and New York were playing fair with each other, the subsequent behavior of the Indians becomes inexplicable. If we assume contrariwise, that Andros and the Marylanders were fencing with each other in a ruthless match of power politics, the most enigmatic actions are stripped of their mystery. The following explanation rests on the latter assumption.

Jacob Young, who was in Maryland’s pay as an interpreter, had won over Captain Cantwell to the long-established Delaware Bay game of lucrative dalliance with the Maryland gentry. Young and Cantwell, knowing Andros’ desire to keep the Susquehannocks under his own control, precipitated peace negotiations with Maryland to balk Andros’ plans. The Maryland Council responded at first in the desire to effect a genuine peace that would safeguard the back country from Susquehannock raids. But after the Piscatawa and Mattawoman Indians had promised to march anywhere to fight the Susquehannocks, the Maryland gentry schemed to launch their allied Indians, followed by troops, into the Delaware valley to fasten themselves onto as much real estate as possible. The excuse would be “hot pursuit” of the enemy into what we nowadays are likely to call a privileged sanctuary. Andros caught on to the scheme and countered it. He dismissed Cantwell for being too ready to connive with the Marylanders. Then Andros issued a veiled threat that Maryland’s Indians could be dealt with by New York’s Indians. But so long as no genuine peace existed between Marylanders and Susquehannocks the threat of hot pursuit would remain. On that account, Andros demanded that the Marylanders receive the Susquehannocks into their own territory or make a final peace with them. If Maryland refused, Andros would permit the Iroquois to take the Susquehannocks. Andros’ primary concern was to get the Susquehannocks away from the threatened Delaware valley. Once they were gone, an incursion from Maryland would be naked aggression and could be dealt with as such, both on the premises and in England. Andros tried to persuade the Susquehannocks to remove to New


York with an invitation that was an ultimatum, but apparently his invitation won small acceptance; the Susquehannocks preferred to live with their "old confederates" the Lenape. It seems that when he failed in this direct approach Andros gave the word to the Iroquois to try their own kind of persuasion. Iroquois hostilities against the Susquehannocks had been suppressed by Andros since his accession to office. Now, after Andros' ultimatums to Maryland and to the Susquehannocks had both passed unheeded, the Iroquois came to life again in a series of actions that were fully in accord with Andros' policies.

Their intervention came to Maryland's attention in December, 1676, through "a small encounter" between some Susquehannocks and Iroquois at Jacob Young's house. Maryland's Deputy Governor Notley saw a mixture of danger and opportunity in the revived Iroquois activity. It was time, he concluded, to adjust "all matters" with "all manner of Indians." But Notley did not panic; his was to be a calculated kind of adjustment. He planned to take "all imaginable pains" to be at peace with both the Iroquois and the Susquehannocks, but more especially with the Iroquois. The policy of 1674 was reactivated as though nothing had happened in the meantime. On Maryland's assumptions it made sense. If the Iroquois were neutralized, they could no longer figure in ultimatums from New York, veiled or otherwise. Perhaps they might even be won to full alliance with Maryland; in that case they could be poised, like Maryland's other Indian allies, against the Lenape-Susquehannock combination on Delaware Bay.

Notley's Council deliberated and chose Major Henry Coursey as ambassador, supplying him with a set of carefully detailed instructions. With a large escort and a bag full of papers, Coursey set off in May for New York by way of New Castle. It was the beginning of a long and expensive journey that produced a treaty, an illusion, a triumph, and an organization. The expense and the illusion came to Maryland. The triumph and the organization were shared by Andros and the Indians. The treaty was the means of all.

THE TREATY OF SHACKAMAXON

As it happened, Coursey was a little late in organizing Maryland's treaty. In March, 1677, two months before Coursey got under way, the Indians had held their own treaty at the Lenape village of Shackamaxon, and their conference had settled most of the substantial issues before Coursey ever started.

The student of Indian affairs has to get used to discovering that source descriptions of really important events have a way of vanishing. Though knowledgeable colonists from the Delaware Bay took part in the Shackamaxon conference for at least four days, they have left no minutes. It is almost certain that they forwarded information to Andros, but the many volumes of New York's colonial documents and Indian records contain no reference to it. Andros himself did not mention the conference in his surviving reports to England. Perhaps nothing but time and carelessness is involved, but it seems likely that there was something else. We have already seen the sort of intrigues that multiplied in the provinces; we ought now to remind ourselves also that conditions in England could never be wholly neglected by provincial officials. Andros' Catholic master, the Duke of York, was in serious political difficulties in Protestant England, and he could not afford to alienate even his Catholic supporters by open conflict with Catholic Lord Baltimore. No matter how obnoxious Baltimore might become, Andros had to manage him with discretion and finesse. Probably Andros quietly destroyed the evidence of his management. We can understand the frustration and suspicions of Maryland's Henry Coursey as he later tried to find out what had happened at Shackamaxon. "I... find a necessity to carry Jacob Young along with mee," he wrote from New Castle, "without whom I can doe nothing, and what truth is to bee had is from him and none else." 97 However, there are a few dependable scraps of information in the court records of New Castle and Upland (Chester). By combining these with Jacob Young's information to Coursey, we can see the main outline of the Shackamaxon conference. 98

It started, apparently, as an all-Indian affair. In early February, 1677, the Susquehannocks passed by New Castle, without stopping, on their...
way “up the River.” In mid-March, some Iroquois ["Sinneco"] Indians came to Shackamaxon “to fetch” the Susquehannocks. The Lenape contested with the Iroquois for Susquehannock allegiance, and the Susquehannocks themselves split into factions. Two of them had previously fled to the Iroquois for sanctuary as the others had come to the Lenape, and these two had accompanied the Iroquois to Shackamaxon, seemingly to plead the Iroquois cause. The Lenape appealed to the magistrates at Upland to intervene. Lenape “Emperor” Renowickam suggested to Captain Collier and the magistrates that they join the Shackamaxon conference with a proposal to have Andros arbitrate the issue. The magistrates agreed. Collier and an undisclosed number of the magistrates joined the conference from March 14 to 18, but no indication exists that Renowickam’s suggestion of a delegation to Andros was adopted. Perhaps the Iroquois could say that they already knew Andros’ mind. Collier surely knew that Andros wanted the Susquehannocks out of the Delaware Bay region.

However that may be, it is clear that the Iroquois did not come with hostile intentions against anybody. They even offered to make peace with Maryland through the agency of Captain Collier. He shrugged them off with the story of what had happened when he had earlier taken Andros’ mediation offer to Maryland. The response he had received was that “Maryland would make warr or peace att their own pleasure.” Considering Maryland’s attitude (and the fact that Andros had been “incensed” by it), Collier would not undertake to speak in Maryland’s behalf, not even to accept the offer of peace.

But the main issue at Shackamaxon was the disposition of the Susquehannocks, and it is clear that the Susquehannocks themselves decided it. Some of them agreed to go off with the Iroquois. Others, however, insisted still on remaining with the Lenape. Apparently no group of Susquehannock chiefs existed any longer with sufficient authority to preserve a unitary polity.

This fact of choice must be noted well. As will be shown in following pages, a myth of Iroquois conquest of the Susquehannocks was manufactured in 1683 to serve a political purpose. To examine the process of mythmaking at this point would be premature, but we may profitably look into an immediately relevant factor that has contributed to the myth’s durability. Confusion has arisen about supposed Iroquois despotism because of an incident that occurred to the troop returning from Shackamaxon to Iroquoia. It stopped off at the Susquehanna River and picked up thirty more of the “chiefe Warriors.” After several days’ march, an argument arose over how the Susquehannocks should be divided between the Iroquois communities, and the Susquehannocks were so “displeased” by the arrangements that some of them “got away.” Much has been read into Jacob Young’s information that the rest were bound up by the Iroquois to travel as captives for the rest of the journey, but the significance of this fact must be interpreted in the light of Coursey’s comment on it. “It is Judged,” he remarked, that the Iroquois desired “not to hurt them, for every one of the [Iroquois] forts strive what they can to get them to themselves, and Governor Andros to get them to the Mohawks,” for it was told me by Capt. Delavall that if they had them they would make warr immediately with the French.”

Thus the very source that has been used to show the Susquehannocks’ “subjection” discloses intentions of the Iroquois far removed from tyranny. We have an echo here of the “subjection” in which the Lenape had been supposed to live previously under the Susquehannocks. But what the Iroquois wanted were reinforcements, not serfs or slaves. The isolated incident of the binding of Susquehannocks en route to Iroquoia was a temporary expedient in an awkward situation. Later records show quite clearly that the Susquehannocks at Iroquoia had full freedom of movement. They looked upon their residence there as security from Maryland, and continued to make war upon enemies of their own choosing in pursuit of their own policies, frequently inducing their supposed conquerors to join them.

THE TREATY OF ALBANY

Three weeks after the Iroquois delegation had left Shackamaxon, Andros increased his pressure on the Susquehannocks still remaining at the Delaware. He sent word that they should locate themselves anywhere they pleased within his government except among the Lenape, “it being dangerous to both.” Perhaps he meant that the Iroquois were willing to start a war with the Lenape for the sake of the 26 remaining Susquehannock families, but the notion lacks credibility. The Iroquois had already won by far the majority of

99 Sources for all the foregoing in n. 98.
100 Order of Council, 6 April, 1677, N. Y. Col. Docs. 12: p. 572.
the Susquehannocks, and to argue that Andros was too fearful of them to attempt to protect the remaining Susquehannocks against them would be absurd. If Andros could not have protected the Susquehannocks while they were among the Lenape, he surely could not have protected them against the Iroquois anywhere else. Andros’ insistence that the precise location at Delaware Bay constituted the hazard reveals that he apprehended the danger’s source to be in Maryland. In spite of his pressure, and certainly without fear of the Iroquois, the Susquehannocks and the Lenape continued their previous relationship of guests and hosts.

As remarked earlier, by the time that Maryland’s Henry Coursey started on his peacemaking mission to the Iroquois, full preparation had been made by his several antagonists to settle matters to their own liking. Indeed news of his mission came to New Castle as a surprise of dubious import. An alarm was raised and a company of militia was summoned to man the fort. “there to bee upon their Garde and Receive such further order as shall be found necessary.”101

Coursey got little information and less help at New Castle. Captain Collier, he found, had been an “evill Instrument” to Maryland, and Collier showed no signs of change. After Coursey had spent several frustrating days at New Castle, Jacob Young arrived. Through him, Coursey finally was able to talk to some of the Indians of the vicinity. Four Susquehannocks, in tow of Renowickam, came to declare their desire for peace with Maryland. They were so little in fear of the Iroquois that they promised Coursey to “endeavour to speak” with any Iroquois party that might come to the region, thus “to prevent any miseife that may be done” either by the Iroquois or by any Susquehannocks accompanying them. It was hardly the sort of interview that expectant victims would normally initiate. Both the Susquehannocks and the Lenape chief were pleased with Coursey’s mission; they promised to send representatives of their own to New York to join the grand treaty in the making there.102

The treaty got under way rather slowly. Had the Susquehannocks remained on the Delaware and Susquehanna rivers, Coursey could have approached them directly with his own interpreter, Jacob Young. Now, however, he found that Edmund Andros was to be his intermediary, willy-nilly. Coursey spent much of June in New York, haggling with Andros over the terms with which he would be permitted to approach Andros’ wards.103

Though ill-informed about the Susquehannocks, Maryland’s Council had expected to have to approach the Iroquois through Andros, so Coursey’s formal Instructions had been prepared in reproachless form. Coursey was to be sure to include Virginia and all the allied Indians in a “universal” peace. He was to make indemnity to the Iroquois for “injuries done by our Neighbours to them unknowne to us.” He was to explain to the Iroquois that Maryland’s hostilities had all been provoked by deceptions practiced by the wicked Susquehannocks: “we afterwards found out that those very murders which the Susquehannocks fathered upon the Cinnigos were committed by the Susquehannocks themselves, and that was the real cause of the war.” Coursey was also to demonstrate Maryland’s purity of heart: all this effort was being made “for to settle our owne peace, nothing [being] more to the decreasing of his Majesty’s Customs than such distractions as take the people from Planting.” As a final sign of Lord Baltimore’s good will, Coursey was “to make a present of One hundred pounds Sterling to the Governor of New York as a token of his Lordshipps thankfulness for his care and kindness shewn to this Province.”104 After such an explosion of magnanimity, only a confirmed cynic could still resist the Lord Baltimore’s benevolent designs, but Andros behaved like the boor who accepts an election bribe only to vote for the other party.

He had reasons. Even while he and Coursey wrestled over treaty terms, the Maryland Council decided to “grant” 8,000 acres of land “within this Province [of Maryland] on the Seaboard side” in order to combat settlers who “doe pretend to be under the Government of New York.” Discreetly

101 Minutes, 15 May, 1677, Records of the Court of New Castle, 1676-1681, Liber A (MS. photostats), p. 87, HSP.
103 Council minutes, 6 June, 1677, N. Y. Col. Docs. 13: pp. 507-508; Baltimore to Wm. Blathwait, 11 March, 1682, Md. Arch. (PRO) 5: p. 349. It should be noted that the New York Council still referred to the “Maques and Sinnekes Indyans,” lumping the four non-Mohawk nations under the “Seneca” label, though the existence of “five Respective Castles” was known. The word “Sinekes” or “Senecas” was an early Algonquian name for all the upper Iroquois. Van Laer, Minutes of Fort Orange 2: p. 45 n.
104 Coursey’s Commission and Instruction, 30 April, 1677, Md. Arch. (PRO) 5: pp. 243-246.
the Council decided to postpone “a right understanding” with New York about the Whorekills jurisdiction until after Henry Coursey had returned with his treaty safely signed. However, the Marylanders underestimated Andros’ capacity to keep himself informed of such matters. Maryland surveyors had been at work in the Whorekills even before the Maryland Council acted, and a Whorekills resident had written to inform Andros about them. While Coursey offered Andros soft words and hard money, Andros maintained diplomatic urbanity, but he had in his pocket the clue to Maryland’s real intentions. On the face of it Coursey’s disingenuous approach could hardly disguise the damage that Coursey proposed to inflict on the Duke of York’s interests. The speech prepared by Coursey as the desired terms of Maryland’s peace went far beyond his open Instructions. He assumed a haughty, browbeating stance. Maryland had “fallen upon” the Susquehannocks, he boasted, “and have now so near destroyed them that they are forced to seek shelter under you [the Iroquois] who were before their Enemies.” As the price of peace Coursey wanted to demand that the Iroquois police the Susquehannock refugees in their villages. Any Susquehannock suspected by the Maryland government of criminal activity would have to be delivered up by the Iroquois for adjudication and punishment within Maryland and under Maryland law. The effect of such terms would be to make the Iroquois formally responsible to Maryland instead of New York. The speech was never spoken. What Andros finally approved for actual delivery to the Iroquois was a bland homily that kept well within the peace and good will formula of Coursey’s formal Instructions. Not only was the brag about destroying the Susquehannocks deleted; all reference whatever to those Indians was suppressed. The treaty became, in form, a negotiation solely between Maryland and the Iroquois. The sanctions that Coursey had wanted to impose turned into a mild request for reciprocity of good faith:


that your Indians, nor none liveing among you or coming through your Country, doe for the future injure any of our Persons (Piscataway or other our Indians living with us) or goods, and if any ill Person should doe any harm, that there be Present full Satisfaction given, for all Injuries or dammages.

Coursey tried to recover the lost ground by getting to the Iroquois directly. He arranged through Jacob Young—thus avoiding Albany’s official interpreters and censors—to hold a private meeting in his own room. There he proposed to the sachems that a new conference should be held the following year, at Onondaga, away from New York’s supervision. Always willing to explore the possibilities of interprovincial competition, the Iroquois agreed; but, for some unknown reason, Maryland never fulfilled the arrangement with an actual embassy.

RESULTS OF THE ALBANY TREATY

In spite of all restrictions and frustrations, Coursey left Albany with an illusion of ultimate triumph. He had finally made contact with the elusive Iroquois and had provided for meeting them again on better terms. He did get what he thought was a full and final peace embracing Virginia and his Indian allies as well as Maryland. The danger of a Lenape-Susquehannock confed-eracy had been circumvented, it seemed. At Albany, Coursey succeeded, as he thought, in two particular accomplishments: the Lenape became obligated by the terms of the peace even though they had not spoken formally at the conference; and the Susquehannocks lost diplomatic recognition as a nation capable of speaking for themselves.

Coursey had yet one more reason for satisfaction—perhaps the best one. Lord Baltimore had been in London answering official questions ever since the outbreak of all the violence in 1675. The same Protestant politicians who wanted to bring down James Stuart also menaced Baltimore’s gov-

108 Propositions of Henry Coursey, Md. Arch. (PRO) 5: p. 254. Cf. text in Livingston Indian Records, p. 42, dated at New York, 30 June, 1677. Apparently the Livingston Indian Records text, which is even milder than the speech finally delivered by Coursey, was Andros’ original bargaining stance. The Maryland Archives text seems to be the outcome of all the haggling, and seems to have been delivered on the twentieth of July at Albany.
ernment of his province. Complaints about Baltimore's bias against Protestants in Maryland were supplemented by his evident inability to protect his back settlers from Indians. To stall hostile action Baltimore lied boldly to the Privy Council's Committee of Trade and Plantations. He told the Lords in 1677 that the "Peace with the Northern Indians bordering upon his Province has held for twenty years and is yearly confirmed by the Indians." Embarrassingly, he was asked for evidence. Coursey's treaty at Albany last gave Baltimore something in writing to offer the Lords. The treaty did not confirm his words, but it did at least seem to show signs of effort and accomplishment in relations with the Indians. Perhaps Coursey's treaty weighed in the final decision to let Baltimore keep his government. If so, the treaty served in this regard only to postpone, not to eliminate, Baltimore's loss of his government. What the Lords failed to take in 1677, Maryland's people would seize in 1689. They, too, were dissatisfied with the effects of Baltimore's Indian policies.

Coursey's companion and interpreter, Jacob Young, found no comfort at all in the treaty. Young had been more than a trader among the Susquehannocks. An Onondaga spokesman disclosed that Jacob Young had been "a great Leader and Captain" in the prolonged Susquehannock-Iroquois wars. Maliciously the Onondagan added that Young had been "a great occasion" of the Iroquois attacks on both Christians and Indians. (It may be noted that, though Coursey's Instructions had been to curry favor with the Iroquois by blaming the Susquehannocks for backwoods killings, the Iroquois matter-of-factly admitted their culpability.) Young could see the implications for himself of Maryland's acquiescence in the Susquehannocks' disappearance into Iroquoia. Young's business was at the Chesapeake; the business would depart with its patrons. Perhaps Young also had become Indian enough to feel humiliated by the legal extinction of the nation he had led and befriended. He mourned to Coursey, "If he had known before coming that the Susquehannocks were not to be included in the peace, he would rather have given 20,000 pounds of tobacco than to come." Coursey remembered the remark and turned it against Young on a later occasion.

We have called Coursey's triumph an illusion. Now it remains to be seen who actually won the peace. The curious fact is that all the other participants—even the silent Susquehannocks and Lenape—gained more than Maryland. Andros preserved New York's monopoly on negotiations with the Indians of his government. As he had gained some of New England's Indians with his "tree of peace" at Scaticook, now he gained the manpower and fur-trading expertise of the Susquehannocks. The Iroquois gained the warriors they so badly needed. The Susquehannocks everywhere gained sanctuary from Maryland. Both the Lenape and the Susquehannocks at Delaware Bay were relieved of the menace of attack from Maryland, and with the signing of the treaty Andros relaxed his efforts to make the remaining Susquehannocks at the Bay remove elsewhere.

FORGING OF THE COVENANT CHAIN

The particular gains of the moment, substantial as they were, appear slight today in comparison with the treaty's more long-lasting achievement. This was disclosed in a speech of the Mohawks, the Indians who had always been physically and politically closest of the Iroquois to Albany. "We are glad," they told Coursey, that the Governor General hath been pleased to designate and appoint this place to speake with all Nations in peace . . . especially that his Honor hath been pleased to grant you the privilege for to speake with us here . . . for the Covenant that is betwixt the Governor Generall and us is Invioable; yea, so . . .

113Minutes of Committee for Trade and Plantations, 10 April, 1676; 18 Dec., 1677; 26 March, 1678; 15 April, 1678, Md. Arch. (PRO) 5: pp. 125-130, 263, 264, 258, 269.
strong that if the very thunder should break upon the Covenant Chain, it would not break it asunder. Thus the historic Iroquois covenant chain came into effective existence. The many treaties binding New York to its various Indians had now become institutionalized in an organization.\textsuperscript{115}

Even in its origins the chain implied Iroquois primacy among the Indians bound together by it, but this was no forest empire created by conquest. Though the national identity of the Susquehannocks was submerged, there can be small doubt that the decisions at Albany, as at Shackamaxon, were made by discussion and consent. The key figure throughout was Edmund Andros. It was Andros' intervention that brought refuge to the harassed Susquehannocks, and Andros' maneuvers that frustrated Maryland's intrigues at the Delaware Bay. It was also Andros who gave the Iroquois a new lease on life. Before his coming, the Iroquois had been demoralized and enfeebled, losing battles on every side. The sudden change in their fortunes was the product of New York's power used for New York's purposes. As Andros delicately reported to England, "Colonel Coursey hadd answers to his satisfaction," while Andros got "reiterated assurances from said Indyans of their faithfulness."\textsuperscript{116}

What we see in the 1677 treaty is the further development of the Indian policy adopted by Andros in 1675. Andros' policy was to rely upon favored instruments among the Indians in order to control the more unruly elements. He chose the Mohawks to be his special friends in New York, and through the Mohawks he drew under his wing the whole Iroquois League. In his government of Delaware Bay, Andros' instrument was at first the Lenape nation. After 1677 these favored instruments came into closer relationship to each other through the enlargement and modification of the Iroquois League. Previously the League had "adopted" defeated nations and communities. Now it acquired a new flexibility of organization that made possible a special relationship with the Mahicans at Scaticook and the Lenape at the Delaware, both of which peoples were within Andros' jurisdiction and under his protection.\textsuperscript{117}

By drawing the chief belligerents into one organization the new confederation resolved in one moment all the Indian conflicts that had plagued the Hudson, Delaware, and Susquehanna valleys since the start of the beaver wars. All of the Indians within the confederation were immeasurably strengthened by it; but, as the Mohawks so quickly had perceived, the Iroquois were strengthened most of all. Their backs were now protected by inclusion in the covenant chain of the Mahicans and Lenape, and their fighting strength was greatly enhanced by the adopted Susquehannocks. If Andros had sponsored the covenant chain primarily for his own purposes, he certainly had also served the Indians well. The revitalized Iroquois rebounded from their low point in 1674 to begin the series of military and diplomatic maneuvers that were to make their covenant chain a balancing factor in English interprovincial politics and a third power between England and France. To the Iroquois, covenant chain relationships did not imply passive neutrality. In their eyes the peace within the chain established a secure base from which an aggressive policy could be conducted against outsiders. Covenant chain power had its limits, as the Iroquois themselves well knew; the desires of Albany's merchants and New York's Governor could never be flouted. But the interests of Albany were firmly committed to the prosperity of the Indian trade, and an enlarged covenant chain meant an enlarged trade. Albany soon showed great sympathy for Iroquois ambitions.

\textbf{SUSQUEHANNOCK REVENGE}

What of the Susquehannocks in all this? Their disappearance soon gave Maryland cause to grieve. In 1679 an Indian informant told Lord Baltimore that "the Susquehannocks laugh and jeare at the English saying they cann doe what chain. The subject is too complex and controversial to be discussed properly in a note. Among modern authorities, C. A. Weslager argues the theory that the Iroquois really did conquer the Lenape: "The Delaware Indians as Women," \textit{Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences}, 34 (1944) : pp. 381-388. Anthony F. C. Wallace uses anthropological evidence as well as historical data to conclude that the "woman" status of the Lenape was not a product of conquest and subjugation: \textit{King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, 1700-1763} (Philadelphia, 1949), pp. 195-196; "Woman, Land, and Society: Three Aspects of Aboriginal Delaware Life," \textit{Pennsylvania Archaeologist} 17 (1947) : pp. 1-35. My own reasoning follows Wallace, both because of the factual findings of this present article and also because of my findings in "The Delaware Inter-regnum," cited n. 5.


\textsuperscript{117} I assume that this treaty was the event that converted the Lenape into "women" in the Iroquois covenant.
mischief they please for that the English cannot see them."118 Safely out of reach in their Iroquois sanctuary, the Susquehannocks planned vengeance on the Indians who had helped Maryland and who had blocked the peace negotiations in 1676: the Piscatawans and Mattawomans.119 Iroquois leaders saw advantage in the feud. They ignored their obligations under Coursey's treaty and joined Susquehannock raiding parties on the back country of Maryland and Virginia. As with the beaver wars of previous decades, vengeance and feuding made complications, but a rational policy can be discerned in the superficially confused conflicts. The Iroquois helped the Susquehannocks because the Iroquois could thereby force Maryland's Indians into subjugation. The Iroquois had never conquered the Susquehannocks or the Lenape, but they set out in dead earnest to conquer the Piscatawans and Mattawomans. In the long run, with enthusiastic Susquehannock participation, they succeeded.120

Though their heaviest blows fell upon Maryland's Indians, the province's white back settlers inevitably were also hurt. In bewilderment, Protestant backwoodsmen thought they saw a papist plot behind their suffering. Did not the attacking Indians come from the direction of Catholic Canada? And were not Lord Baltimore and the governing gentry of Maryland of the Catholic persuasion? Q.E.D.: Baltimore had called in French Indians to destroy his always considerable Protestant opposition. That opposition fed on such fears until it grew beyond the power of even Baltimore's busy hangmen to control.121

118 Conference minutes, 19 March, 1679, Md. Arch. (Council) 15: p. 239.
121 For an example of wild rumor, see a deposition of 15 June, 1681, Md. Arch. (Council) 15: p. 420. "Mr. Nicholas Bodkin . . . saith that he was present when the said Mordecai said that he heard that the boy reported that the Indian said that the English called Romans and the Sinniquos were to join and kill the Protestants." See also the "Complaint from Heaven with a Hue and cryn," 1676, addressed to the Lord Mayor of London and duly

Maryland's gentry, of course, refused to see just retribution in the Indian raids for their rash and treacherous conduct, though they privately admitted that they had betrayed the Susquehannocks.122 They demanded that New York enforce Coursey's treaty by denying trade goods to the Iroquois. The New Yorkers replied that they could not see any good reason for such a drastic step. Baltimore tried to make direct contact with the Iroquois through Jacob Young, whereupon Andros summoned Young to New York for presuming "to Treat with the Indyans within this Government without any Authority, to the Disturbance thereof." Baltimore had no recourse but finally to send his agents to Albany again, and once again they achieved exactly as much as the Albany magistrates would permit. Coursey's treaty in 1677 had ended with illusions, but his new treaty of 1682 left small doubt of where power over Indian affairs would center thereafter. The Iroquois acknowledged their dependence on Albany, but they treated with Maryland as equals, and they did not knuckle under to Maryland's demands. In fact, they converted the peace into a conquest by proclaiming the enlargement of the covenant chain to include Maryland's Indians. This, of course, had been precisely the object of the raids.123

BEGINNINGS OF PENNSYLVANIA

As though there were not already enough political complications in the former New Netherland, the royal Stuart brothers now made more. James, the Duke, sold off the Jerseys. Charles, passed on to the Lords of Trade. Md. Arch. (PRO) 5: pp. 134-152.
the King, granted away (to discharge a formidable debt) a province called Pennsylvania. As regarded Pennsylvania, certain difficulties were correctly anticipated. Lord Baltimore at once protested that the lord of Pennsylvania was seizing some lands that by right belonged to the lord of Maryland. Baltimore neither surprised nor impressed anybody; his claiming propensities were already well known to the Stuarts. The only thing new in the conflict of claims was William Penn's offer to negotiate some sort of compromise. The Dutch had stuck to their claims and gone down. The Duke of York, through Andros, had maintained his claims with notable success. Penn, like the thorough Quaker he was, offered to talk things over. He very rapidly learned what he was up against.

The heart of Penn's problem was his need for a port—a good port—for his new feudal domain. Stuart generosity had had its limits; Penn's grant did not include the revenue-producing settlements on the Delaware Bay. He would not be able to take over a functioning port, but would have to populate and finance his own. While in England, Penn had planned for two ports, one on the Delaware River and a second on Chesapeake Bay. He had thought that his chartered boundaries included the head of the Chesapeake. He was seriously disturbed when personal reconnaissance, as well as Baltimore's protests, raised serious questions about where Pennsylvania's line would fall. A port could not be located higher on the Susquehanna River because the river's rocks and shallows made it unnavigable. One thing was certain: without free access to the sea, Penn's millions of acres of potential profit would be so many empty dreams, and his planned port on the Delaware would be always dependent on the good will of the governments controlling Delaware Bay. Penn tried without success to negotiate with Baltimore for possible purchase of the head of the Chesapeake.124

SIGNIFICANCE OF PENN'S INDIAN DEEDS

When Penn realized that he could not succeed in a direct approach to Baltimore, he tried flanking movements. Like the Dutch, he put his trust in purchases from the native owners of the soil. Let us pause for a moment to examine the importance that Penn attached to such purchases. Both his motives and his good sense have been ill-understood. That he expressed benevolence toward the Indians is demonstrated amply by the prices he paid, which were far higher than those given by other Europeans. But Penn also demonstrated great practicality and a deeper knowledge of Indian customs than he has been credited with. Though questions have been raised about the value of Indian deeds because various Indians seem to have sold the same tract of land several times over, Penn, who had the most reason to complain about double purchase, understood the reason for it. He wrote:

It hath been the Practice of America, as well as the Reason of the thing itself, even among Indians and Christians, to account not taking up, marking and (in some degree) planting a Reversion of Right; for the Indians do make People buy over again that land [which] the People have not seated in some years after purchase, which is the Practice also of all those [colonial] Governments towards the People inhabiting under them.125

Such an attitude, revealing as it is, might not have supported Penn's hopes to acquire the Chesapeake property, for sparse settlement had already been made at the head of the bay. But the murky history of Maryland and the Susquehannocks gave Penn an exceptional opportunity. The second Lord Baltimore had purchased from the Susquehannocks all the land on the west side of the Chesapeake up to the mouth of the Susquehanna, and had also purchased all the land on the east side of the bay almost up to the east bank of the Susquehanna. Unhappily for Maryland's claims, there was a considerable gap between the two purchases. There may be some significance in the fact that Jacob Young's trading post was located in that gap.126 Be that as it may, the strategic head of the bay remained unpurchased only so long as it took Penn to find the Indian who claimed ownership. On 18 October, 1683, Penn bought "from Macalaloha, owner of said lands," the tract

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124 Baltimore to Wm. Blathwait, 11 March, 1682, Md. Arch. (PRO) 5: p. 349; Baltimore's account of a private conference with Penn, 29 May, 1683, ibid. 5: pp. 399-400.

125 Wm. Penn's Instructions to Capt. Markham respecting Lord Baltimore, ca. 1683, MS., Cadwalader Collection, Thomas Cadwalader (Coates List No. 12), HSP. This is an extraordinarily important document which seems to have been overlooked in historical discussions of Indian land transactions. The principle stated by Penn, of confirming ownership by occupancy, underlay the Homestead Act distribution of public lands by the United States. It is still in force.

126 Articles of Peace and friendship, 5 July, 1652, Md. Arch. (Council) 3: pp. 277-278; Young's post is clearly identified on John Thornton, A Map of Some of the South and east bounds of Pennsylvania in America (London, 1681) available in HSP.
"lying between Delaware, Chesapeake bay and Susquehannah river," consummating the transaction "in the presence of many Indians." 127

Maryland protested, as was to be expected, and just possibly Maryland may have been justified. But Baltimore—having warred upon the Susquehannocks and refused them recognition for a peace—was in an awkward position to compete for the purchase of Susquehannock lands. The Marylanders fell back on an assertion that the Indians who sold the land to Penn were not Susquehannocks at all, but Lenape. Very likely this was so, but there is no way of knowing now what sort of arrangements had been made between the Lenape and the Susquehannocks resident among them. It is worth noting that no counter claimants appeared. Even the Iroquois, for all their false brag about winning the Susquehanna valley by conquest, did not claim below the location of the Susquehannocks' home fort, and that lay well to the north of Penn's purchase. We may note well also that many Indians witnessed Penn's Chesapeake transaction, and the Indians of Chesapeake and Delaware bays had become well aware of the pecuniary possibilities in land claims. In any case, Penn scored a point. He had bought from native claimants their rights to the land at the head of Chesapeake Bay, and Baltimore had no deed to match his.128

Being a practical man, Penn provided against the possibility that his Chesapeake claim might fail, as it ultimately did. His real concern was to get independent access to the sea, wherever he had to go for it. Lacking guarantees on the Chesapeake, he moved to acquire them on the Delaware. His method was utterly simple: using an early variant of the installment plan, he bought the bay colony. That is to say, he acquired possession from the Duke of York in consideration of paying half the colony's annual revenue to the Duke. What rage must have possessed Lord Baltimore can only be guessed. For thirty-five years the Calverts had connived and fought to lay hands on the Delaware Bay. Now an interloper—and a Quaker!—accomplished in a minute what decades of costly intrigue had failed to do. Baltimore's consolation was only that Penn could be fought more openly and more hopefully than the brother of the King.129

Baltimore had some show of justification for his anger. Though Penn's offers to negotiate disputed points were undoubtedly sincere, they came a little late. Even before coming to America, Penn had sent a letter to settlers on the upper Chesapeake to refrain from paying taxes or assessments “by any order or law of Maryland.” Baltimore's furious rebuttal included a door-to-door personal canvass of the residents of Marcus Hook on the Delaware, “prohibiteing the inhabitants to pay any more quit rents to Mr. Penn.”130

were made by the chiefs acting for the whole nation collectively. But the dispersion of the Susquehannocks in 1675-1677 raises many exceptional issues. Were land rights extinguished by the dispersion? There are some grounds to think that the Shackamaxon treaty may have divided the Susquehannocks' lands as well as their bodies, allotting the portion north of Conestoga to the Iroquois contingent and the portion below Conestoga to the Lenape contingent. A claim apparently was made by the Lenape soon after the Shackamaxon-Albany treaty making, and it was recognized, at least for the purpose of discussion, by the Maryland Council on 13 June, 1678. Md. Arch. (Council) 15: p. 175.


JACOB YOUNG'S PREDICAMENT

One person was very awkwardly in the middle of these struggles of great men. Jacob Young had an estate on the Delaware and a trading post at the head of Chesapeake Bay. He was employed by Baltimore and paid taxes to Penn.131 His trading post was situated precisely in the tract that Baltimore had failed to purchase from the Susquehannocks and that Penn claimed. Young was in the middle in another fashion also. His long friendship with the Susquehannocks had roused dark suspicions among some of his neighbors. In 1680 rumors circulated that Young had hired Indians to kill Christians.132 He sued in New Castle court for defamation, and won an apology from the slanderer, but similar rumors apparently found their way to the suspicious gentry of Maryland. As on earlier occasions, Young went along with Henry Coursey to interpret at Albany in 1682. During the treaty Coursey urged the Iroquois to declare whether “some Christian hath stirred you up to make war upon the Piscataway Indians.” Albany's interpreters relayed the Oneidas' answer that Young had been the man.133 Coursey recalled Young's previous opposition to the diplomatic “extermination” of the Susquehannocks. On returning to Maryland, Coursey accused Young to Lord Baltimore. Suddenly Young found himself in most extremely vile durance while Baltimore called a special session of the Assembly to try him for high treason.134

Susquehannock memories of a friend were as long as Iroquois memories of an enemy. The Susquehannocks living among the Lenape gave a message to a Delaware Swede for transmittal to Maryland. They told him

that whatever could be Alleged against Jacob Young touching any thing concerning the Indian Affairs was

131 Young appears as one of the most considerable taxpayers in the jurisdiction of New Castle Court as of 9 Nov., 1677. Out of a total of 307 tithables, Young was listed by the court for five: himself, three slaves, and a servant. Records of the Court at New Castle, 1676-1681, Liber A, pp. 195, 197, 199 (MS. photostats) HSP. No proceedings against him for failure to pay taxes appear in any of the court records. In 1683 he paid taxes of 18 shillings, 10 pence on 1,000 acres of land and three tithable persons. Ibid., p. 350 (Book C, p. 145).

132 Minutes, 3 Nov., 1680, ibid., Liber B, p. 271.


all false, that the said Young had always kept off them, the Susquehannocks, from doing more Mischief than they did, or else they would have killed many hundreds more in Maryland than they did, but that they were stopped through his means. And the Indians further [said] . . . that in case the Life of the said Jacob Young be taken away, that they would have 500 lives more for him out of Maryland.

This message was delivered promptly. A suddenly sobered Upper House of Assembly resolved that Young was too dangerous a man either to execute or set free. After a year more in prison, he was tried and found guilty on a watered-down indictment. The sentence was commuted to a fine of 13,640 pounds of tobacco. Young was discharged, 31 Oct., 1683, when the Lower House agreed to pay costs amounting to 13,640 pounds of tobacco. Ibid., pp. 518-519.

ORIGIN OF THE IROQUOIS CONQUEST MYTH

While Young suffered through his ordeal, William Penn encountered still more problems of contested jurisdiction. Like all his predecessors in colonizing, Penn hoped to gain substantial profit from the Indian trade; like all the others also, he discovered the ruthlessness of competitors. As Baltimore had tried to block his access to the sea, New York's new Governor Thomas Dongan tried to block access to the furs of the interior. Dongan followed Andros' precedent in using the Iroquois to do covertly what could not be done openly. When Penn sent commissioners to purchase Iroquois quitclaims to the Susquehanna valley, Dongan and the Albany magistrates persuaded the Iroquois to refuse. It was then that the yarn about Iroquois "conquest" of the Susquehannocks was concocted, the purpose being to prevent Penn from purchasing directly from the Susquehannocks, either in Iroquoia or in his own province. To guarantee perpetual control, Dongan obtained from the Iroquois a "grant" of the entire Susquehanna valley which they had so easily conquered. His crime did pay, and well. During his entire term as New York's Governor, Dongan successfully kept Penn out of the Susquehanna valley; he even was able to extract a hundred pounds sterling from Penn later for a fraudulent "deed" to the Susquehanna.

But the Susquehannocks' long stay in limbo was drawing to an end. Dongan's and Baltimore's misdeeds had called up hostile powers beyond their control. As the result of Dongan's manipulation in aggressive action against Canada, the Iroquois were mauled and decimated by the French. Many of their own people fled, either to Canada or to Pennsylvania, to escape the constant warfare. Some of the Susquehannocks also became combat weary and returned to their old homeland to build a new village where Conestoga Creek emptied into the Susquehanna. A new situation evolved. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England released another revolution in Maryland, and Baltimore lost his government for a number of years. Among other things, the new government made amends to Jacob Young for Baltimore's rough handling. Perhaps on the theory that Young must be all right if Baltimore was against him, he was reinstated as Indian interpreter.

RE-EMERGENCE OF SUSQUEHANNOCK POLITY

In 1693 a sachem accompanied Young to Maryland's Council to announce the resurrection of the
Susquehannock nation. The Council minutes are tersely complete:

Interpreter [Jacob Young]: Says that the Susquehannoh Indians, being reduced to a small number and as it were newly grown up, they desire the Favour of the Governor and Council that they may have liberty to Come and settle upon their own Land at the Susquehannoh Fort and to be taken and treated as Friends and have Liberty of coming among us freely without molestation.

Answer: That their Fort, as they call it, falling within the Limits of another Government, as Pensylvania, this Government can take no cognizance thereof; and if, as they pretend, they are in League fore, but they now traded in a different direction.

The “newly grown up” Susquehannocks would contribute actively to the history of another three-quarters of a century before a lynch mob massacred the remnants of their people who had dared to remain at Conestoga during Pontiac’s Rebellion. Others had gone upriver again into Iroquoia, but our study is now complete and we shall make no effort to look that far ahead. We may allow ourselves no more than a glance at the years of Susquehannock transfiguration at the turn of the eighteenth century. From their new home at Conestoga, the revived Susquehannocks maintained peaceful relations with Maryland, at a wary distance. They hunted and traded as before, but they now traded in a different direction. In 1700 William Penn visited their village and got a deed for all the lands “which are or formerly were the Right of the People or Nation called the Susquehannagh Indians”; and there was no more struggle over the Susquehanna valley during Penn’s lifetime. In 1701 he acted as host in Philadelphia and signed a solemn treaty of friendship that won the Indians completely. Gradually, though not in ways that Penn anticipated, Conestoga became an important headquarters for trade and politics; indeed it was from that gateway that the Conestoga wagons soon began to trundle land-hungry immigrants to and through the mountains of the west.

Only when Indian history is part of it can American history be understood. The issues born of the Indian trade and beaver wars in New Netherland’s day continued to agitate provincial politics through the first half of the eighteenth century. The great covenant chain of the Iroquois helped to determine the direction and fate of empires, exerting an influence far out of proportion to the Indians’ ever-dwindling numbers. The land at the head of Chesapeake Bay remained a disputed site where European refugees from quitrents could find happy sanctuary while Penns and Calverts sued and fought. Not until 1763, when Mason and Dixon began to survey their famous line, did the long quarrel end. By a melancholy coincidence, the last of the Susquehannocks at Conestoga met death in the same year.

APPENDIX

LENAPE OWNERSHIP OF DELAWARE VALLEY LANDS

Lenape ownership of the Delaware valley has been disputed in two ways: (1) supposedly the Susquehannocks sold Delaware valley lands in the seventeenth century; (2) in the eighteenth century, the Iroquois briefly denied Lenape ownership, asserting an Iroquois “right of conquest.” Neither of these challenges to the Lenape title withstands close examination. I have already published a refutation of the Iroquois claim in “The Delaware Interregnum,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 89 (1965) : pp. 174–198. My present purpose is to show that the Susquehannocks never claimed Lenape lands.

To substantiate this thesis, I must account for four references in the sources: (1) Thomas Campanius Holm’s remark that the Lenape were “subject and tributary” to the Susquehannocks; (2) Lenape chief Mattahorn’s remark to Governor Stuyvesant in 1651 that he and other Lenape sachems “were great Chiefs and Proprietors of the lands, both by ownership and by descent and appointment of Minquaas [Susquehannocks] and River Indians [Lenape]”; (3) a deposition made in 1684 by old Swedish settlers on the Delaware that Swedish Governor Peter Minuit in 1638 “agreed with the Susquehanna Indians and bought from them as much of the Adjacent Lands as they could shoot over with a Cannon bullet from Cristina”; (4) a deposition made in 1638 by four crewmen of the Swedish ship Kalmar Nyckel.

139 Minutes, 11 April, 1693, Md. Arch. (Council) 8: p. 518.
140 Francis Jennings, “Indian Trade.”
stating that five sachems, representing Susquehannock nations as well as Lenape, "transferred all the land, as many days' journeys on all places and parts of the river as they [the Swedes] requested; upwards and on both sides."  

Besides these source records, there is a positive statement by the authoritative historian of New Sweden, Amandus Johnson. He wrote that the Susquehannocks, about 1630–1636, "were at war with the Delaware [Lenape], who were conquered by them, compelled to pay taxes and to recognize their sovereignty and supervision in matters of land treaties and the like with the whites."  

It will be best to take up these documents in turn.  

(1) The Holm remark identifies no specific transactions. Its vagueness makes it a matter of interpretation as I have already dealt with it in the body of this article.  

(2) The Dutch transaction in 1651 needs to be seen as part of a series of Dutch actions. These began in 1633 when Arent Corssen, an employee of the Dutch West India Company, sailed into the Schuylkill River and there purchased a small plot of land from the Lenape living in the important village of Passyunk. As often happened, Corssen made only a down payment on his purchase price; the Dutch forgot about the rest until their quarrel with the Swedes made it expedient for them to renegotiate Corssen's purchase. In 1646 Dutch Commissioner Andries Hudde bought the area called Wicaco from Lenape sachems Sheghire Hondon and Rinnowyhy. In 1648 Hudde began to build on the Schuylkill, saying that he had been invited to do so by the sachems.  

In 1651 Governor Stuyvesant came to the Delaware from Manhattan, and had two conferences with various Indians. In each of these conferences, the Lenape sachems asserted their ownership of the land and presented some of it to Stuyvesant. Finally, in 1655 four Lenape sachems conveyed to representatives of Governor Stuyvesant certain lands "so far landward in as our right extends. To wit, to the bounds and limits of the Minquaes [Susquehannocks'] country." The special significance of this act was created by the presence of four Susquehannock sachems as witnesses. They were not parties to the conveyance, and they did not protest Lenape claims; the conveying deed lists only Lenape sachems as granting parties. There can be no reasonable doubt that the Dutch recognized only the Lenape as native owners of the soil.  

(3) and (4). The Swedish depositions. The 1684 deposition of Swedish settlers is suspect for at least two reasons, and it is contradicted by other sources of greater probative value. To begin with, the deponents were all over seventy years old, and the precision of their memories is at least open to question. Secondly, the deposition is carefully marked, "These Antient Sweeds doe Certify respectively from the date of their arrivall." Since none of them affirmed being with Governor Minuit in 1638, and none is on record as so being, their testimony about the 1638 transaction can be considered hearsay; their own disclaimer of responsibility is the strongest reason for so classifying it.  

Contrary sources include the deposition of 1638, in the following respects:  

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7 Indian deed, 1648, N. Y. Col. Docs. 1: pp. 588, 593.  

8 MS. deed, 25 Sept., 1646, Cadwalader Collection, Thomas Cadwalader fol., Coates List No. 18, HSP.  


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12 Cited n. 3.  

13 Cited n. 4.
I do not here affirm the correctness of the 1638 deposition, the all-inclusive language of which was almost certainly the product of active imagination. It is given here as one among several documents contradicting the 1684 deposition. My point here is simply that the two depositions, of 1638 and 1684, cannot both be held for true. From other sources I propose to show that neither was true.

The most plausible deponent about the 1638 proceedings was the Lenape chief Mattahorn. He stated that he had been present when Minuit came up the Delaware, and had bargained with Minuit. So far, his statements are confirmed by the sailors’ deposition of 1638, which mentions Mattahorn by name as one of the participating sachems. Mattahorn’s testimony about the nature of the bargain, however, is in flat contradiction to the sailors’. Mattahorn told his story twice to the Dutch, the first time with other Lenape sachems agreeing, in 1648; the second time, in 1651, to Stuyvesant himself. Mattahorn asserted that Governor Minuit had bought only a small piece of land at Paghacket—as much as was contained within “six trees”—“to plant some tobacco on it.” In addition to “some small things” given as presents, the Indians were to receive half the tobacco raised on their granted land. They never got it. Mattahorn said that all the other lands occupied by the Swedes had been “stolen.” He referred only to Lenape landowners. Allowing for Dutch purposes in recording his words, he still sounds truer to what we know of Indian ways than the 1638 deposition of the Kalmar Nyckel seamen.¹⁴

Finally, we have the manuscript journal of Governor Johan Rising, as translated and extracted by Amandus Johnson. On 17 June, 1654, Rising met with twelve sachems of the Lenape—no Susquehannocks being present—and “reminded them of the land, which we had bought from them.” He requested their confirmation of the sale, which (according to Rising) they gave. Clearly he was engaged in trickery; for, when he showed the old deeds to the Lenape sachems, he read only their names, omitting entirely the substance of the deeds. (Thus he could claim later that he had won their assent to the transfer of all their lands, while they were actually agreeing only to what they remembered of their former transactions.) For our purpose, however, we need only note that when the Susquehannock sachem Agaliquanes called on Rising the very next day after his conference with the Lenape, no mention was made of lands. If the Susquehannocks had participated as grantors in the earlier transactions, they would surely have been required, like the Lenape, to confirm their grants. Rising’s failure to raise the subject with Agaliquanes points unmistakably to Rising’s knowledge that the Susquehannocks made no claim to the Delaware valley lands. This conclusion is strengthened by a further fact. On 7 June, 1755, the Susquehannocks did present some land to the Swedes, clearly identified in Rising’s journal as being on the east side of the Elk River. There was no doubt of Susquehannock right there; the Elk fell into Chesapeake Bay and was accordingly outside any Lenape claim. It appears, then, that Governor Rising, like the Dutch, recognized Lenape ownership of the Delaware valley.¹⁵

Rising’s Journal contradicts Holm directly. Holm stated that the Indians’ deeds “were read to them word for word.” Rising stated that he had read only the sachems’ names on the deeds. Eyewitness Peter Lindestrom also stated explicitly that only the sachems’ names were read.¹⁶ The testimony of the two participants certainly outweighs that of the man who used them as his sources, and the discrepancy raises a question. Why did Holm alter what was so plainly stated in his sources? It would appear that Holm was engaged in the familiar historical process of tidying up his ancestors’ morals for public display.

We turn now to Amandus Johnson’s assertion of Susquehannock sovereignty, which is all the more puzzling because Johnson translated and edited the Swedish documents recited above. For his dictum, Johnson cited three sources. First, he gave Thomas Campanius Holm, about whom no more need be said. Johnson also cited “Young’s Report” and Lindestrom, without specifying pages.¹⁷ “Young’s Report,” which Johnson located without series, volume, or page number in the massive Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, apparently refers to the Relation of Captain Thomas Yong who visited the Delaware River in 1634. This document was printed in Mass. Hist. Soc. Collections, 4th series, 9.


(1871): pp. 117–131. Nothing in Yong’s Relation refers to sovereignty, taxes, tribute, or land treaties. He wrote only that the Susquehannocks and the Lenape were in a state of war while he was on the Delaware, with the Susquehannocks apparently having the better of it.

Johnson’s third cited source, Peter Lindestrom, wrote nothing to warrant a belief in Susquehannock sovereignty over the Lenape; on the contrary, he asserted emphatically the independence and proprietary rights of the Lenape. He specifically listed six Lenape towns on the west bank of the Delaware, having “the most intelligent savages of several nations of savages, who own this River and dwell here . . . [under six sachems] each one commanding his tribe or people under him . . . and these chiefs have their names after the name of the countries which they rightfully own.”

Thus, with Yong and Lindestrom eliminated, only Holm is left as source for Amandus Johnson’s sweeping assertion of Susquehannock sovereignty; and, as we have seen, Johnson’s quotations from Governor Rising’s journal emphasize the distinction between the territories of the Susquehannocks and of the Lenape. It appears that Johnson’s “sovereignty” remark was unfounded.

Some of the difficulty in interpreting the sources arises from ambiguity in their language, but perhaps a further thought may be permitted about the confusion. It is to be explained, I think, by the different interests of the parties making the records. The Dutch and the Swedes were all present on the Delaware with one strong motive: they wanted to make a lot of money fast. People with that motive rarely concern themselves much about niceties of truth and honor, and there is every reason to believe that the present case followed the rule. The simplest way to “save the phenomena” is to conclude that the records were kept with less attention to accuracy than to profit. When that rather obvious assumption is made, the conflicts in the sources can be explained in each instance by the situation then prevailing. Perhaps the reader will forgive me for leaving the rest to him.

However, we have to do the best we can with what we have, and there are two more bits of evidence that may be added to the file. The Dutchman, Andries Hudde, and the Swede, Johan Printz, sent private reports to their respective higher authorities, which show complete agreement on the distinction between Susquehannock and Lenape territories. In 1648 Hudde complained that the Swedes were claiming to have bought all the land “on this River [Delaware]. . . likewise the Minquas [Susquehannocks’] land.” In 1651 Governor Printz wrote that the Swedes had bought the Susquehannocks’ country “six years ago, only for the sake of trade,” but that the Swedes had lawfully bought “this country” (the Delaware valley) and “possessed it entirely without reproach for fourteen years.”

Taking all this evidence into account, I can find no serious justification for concluding other than that the Lenape rights of ownership in the Delaware valley were fully respected by the Susquehannocks and recognized by the Europeans.

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18 Linestrom, pp. 170–171.
